Politics of technology and economic development: Tracing the roots of the absence of NSI in the Philippines by King, Elisa B.






Politics of Technology and Economic Development: Tracing the roots of 
the absence of NSI in the Philippines 
 
 






There is a wave of hopelessness that is enveloping the Philippines. A 2006 poll 
found that one of every three Filipinos wanted to leave the country because “they see no 
hope”.1 Poverty continues to be a central development issue in the country. According to 
the 2006 NSCB estimates, 27.6 million Filipinos or 4.8 million families are living below 
poverty line, and poverty has worsened between 2003 and 2006.2 Rather than exporting 
manufactured goods, the Philippines is an aggressive exporter of Filipino workers. From 
the 1990s, a feminization of OFWs (Overseas Filipino Workers) has increased. These 
women have university degrees, such as teachers, nurses, and doctors (turned nurses) 
leaving the country to become nurses, housemaids, entertainers, and caregivers in rich 
countries. But signs of a worrying social cost are already showing.  Recently, 
policymakers and government officials were alarmed by a ‘crisis’ in the country’s health 
sector where some 200 public hospitals had to close down and another 800 hospitals were 
partially closed because nurses and doctors had left the country for a better future in 
foreign lands.3  More than 6 million Filipinos work abroad and in 2006 they sent 
US$11billion in remittances to their families, and this helped prop up a national economy 
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that is up to its neck in debt. A faltering economy and lack of economic opportunity are 
what fuels the exodus of many Filipinos.  
 
This study was undertaken primarily to understand why the Philippines is a 
laggard when compared to East Asia’s ‘achievers’. Numerous explanations have been 
forwarded, and this study seeks to build on this body of scholarship. One of the recurring 
themes in the literature explaining the failure of rapid industrialization is the ‘lack of 
political will’ on the part of the Philippine government to harness science, technology, 
and innovation in economic development.4 My research question, therefore, is: Why does 
the Philippine government seem to lack that ‘political will’, and how did it come into 
being? The challenge facing the Philippines is how to successfully transform a mercantile 
into a production- and service-oriented economy.5 Unlike an economy characterized by 
reinforcing dynamics of highly innovative agriculture, industry, and service sectors, a 
trade-based economy continues to impoverish the majority because it has the unintended 
consequence of concentrating wealth only to a few. Political will is shown when an 
activist government deploys a development strategy that combines trade with innovation 
policy to successfully build a closely-linked innovative agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors, as discussed later.   
 
I argue that the long history of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) and the 
dominance of global historic blocs of which the more cosmopolitan6 Filipino ruling élite 
is a part largely explains the ‘lack of political will’ problem in the Philippines. What 
troubles the Philippines of today are an economy dominated by global trade and financial 
interests and a government controlled by cosmopolitan political leaders and bureaucrats 
which, time and again, have privileged economic liberalism. These interacting political, 
economic and cultural (religious, intellectual) élites established the much wider socio-
economic order in which technological innovative activities required to bring about the 
shift from trade- and finance-based economy to production-oriented one, making 
industrial capitalists more predominant, were completely marginalized. These global 
historic blocs’ trade and financial interests and the technocrats’ commitment to economic 
liberalism imposed free trade policy not only too early in the Philippine development 
path but entrenched institutions and social forces that effectively and subsequently 
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marginalized the role of technological innovation and production in economic 
development.  The foundations of these enduring social structures were laid during the 
Spanish colonial period.7 In this paper my aim is to trace the beginnings of the formation 
and the subsequent entrenchment of the dominant historic bloc in Spanish Philippines 
(1565-1898). I will first discuss the analytical framework, and then proceed to show that 
the first wave of globalization primarily for raw materials and ‘home-spun’ goods, for the 
first time integrated the import-export business interest of global traders and financiers 
(European and locals) who were not necessarily politically in accord with the interest of 
the colonial Spanish government. This will be followed by a discussion of the beginnings 
of local political and cultural forces in the Philippines, highlighting the impact of 
colonialism as fragmentation of the local elite or their nationalist visions, and the legacy 
of the colonial Spanish education system. The social environment of Spanish Philippines 
is examined against the backdrop of 16th- and 18th –century England.    
     
Conceptualizing politics of technology and development 
 
To make sense of the lack of the lack of political will problem, I combine Prof. 
Chris Freeman’s concept of NSI and the historical materialist approaches advanced by 
the Italian political economic theorist, Antonio Gramsci and the Canadian international 
political economic theorist, Robert Cox. I suggest that NSI is an historical structure, 
emphasizing the role of a malleable coalition of political, technological, and cultural 
forces or human agents in the economic transformation equation. Here NSI is deployed in 
an instrumental way, that is, it is something that is not natural, but is created by human 
effort.  Freeman defines NSI as a network of institutions in public and private spheres 
whose activities and interactions are geared towards the production, adaptation, diffusion 
and application of technology in the economy.8 Later, he emphasizes the national and 
regional dimension of the system within the context of an increasingly integrated world 
economy, arguing that although international linkages are growing in importance, the 
influence of national factors, particularly the education system, industrial relations, 
technical and scientific institutions, government policies, cultural traditions and many 
local institutions are fundamental to establish NSI.9  
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In a more recent work, Freeman puts a spotlight on the complementarity and 
integration of these institutions in order to promote economic growth.10 But most 
importantly he distinguishes between “narrow” and “broad” definitions of NSI, with the 
former focusing on “those institutions which deliberately promote the acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge and are the main sources of innovation”, and the latter 
“recognizes that these ‘narrow’ institutions are embedded in a much wider socio-
economic system in which political and cultural influences as well as economic policies 
help to determine the scale, direction and relative success of all innovative activities.” 
The synergies produced by this configuration of political, economic, technological, and 
cultural forces constitute the ‘broader NSI’ which historically has provided an 
environment hospitable to the shift from a trade- and finance-based economy to a 
manufacturing one.  
 
While the integration of institutions is quite significant in NSI, this task can be 
more appropriately done by the state. Bjorn Johnson argues that formal and informal 
rules on property rights, cooperation, long-term credit, and public good significantly 
affect an organization like business firms’ inclination to innovate and to share 
information, hence arguably a nation-state’s institutional set-up influences innovation and 
learning processes. 11 This has serious implications for the role of governments because, 
as is evident in the above definitions of NSI, there is a need to integrate institutions in 
such a way that synergies among them can be achieved. Nonetheless, the NSI approach 
does not have a theory of the state. Given these limitations, it is essential that the NSI 
framework be combined with compatible frameworks from other disciplines, such as 
political economy. Susan Strange may exaggerate when she argues that “the state is in 
retreat” in the era of globalization because the state, though undergoing some 
transformation, certainly plays an important role in this whole process of change.12 As 
Leo Panitch points out, the state is an active agent of the process of globalization itself13 
(including technological innovation) because it is the only institution empowered to make 
and enforce collectively binding decisions in the intra and inter-state system14 so much so 
that international governance institutions also need the state to realize their goals.   
 
Freeman’s broader concept of NSI corresponds with Gramsci’s notion of a 
modern state. The modern state, according to him is an ‘expanded’ one which 
constitutes the interacting political, intellectual, and material forces which he termed a 
national historic bloc. These interacting forces correspond to those forces (or 
institutions) which Freeman suggests as crucial in a functional NSI.  I propose that NSI is 
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economic growth’, Research Policy 31, 2002, pp. 191-211.   
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Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, pp. 23-67. 
12 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
13 Leo Panitch, ‘Rethinking the role of the state in an era of globalization’, Paper presented at the American 
Political Science Association and reprinted in the Socialist Register, Mimeo, 1994. 
14 Geoffrey Underhill, ‘Conceptualizing the changing global order’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey 
Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University 




an historical structure – a malleable coalition of political, technological, and cultural 
forces whose decisions and ‘often uneasy alliance’ or interaction produce structures 
which facilitate or constrain the development and effective use of productive knowledge 
in an economy (Figure 1-1). The relationship of these forces is non- deterministic. This 
means that the political (politicians and bureaucrats) and cultural élites (intellectuals, 
religious leaders, and educators) exert influence (intentionally or unintentionally) on the 
economic élites just as much as they are also influenced. Furthermore, Gramsci’s idea of 
power is exercised primarily in the form of hegemony or moral and intellectual 
leadership. The ruling élites are able to realize key decisions which are beneficial to 
them, either by maintaining the status quo or promoting change, through consensus rather 
than coercion. The consensual assent of the people ruled is achieved through the 
promotion of ‘common sense’ ideas – these are unquestioned ideas embraced by the 
people. 15 
 
 Figure 1 -1 NSI as an historic bloc 
  
      
 





Gramsci’s notions of national historic bloc and hegemony were appropriated by 
Cox in the international arena. Cox argues that as a global mode of production (e.g, 
Fordist or the present knowledge-based) penetrates into all countries it brings about links 
among national productive forces, thus forming a transnational or global historic bloc. 
The economic life of subordinate states is penetrated by and intertwined with that of 
dominant state(s). Thus, there is “passive revolution” in dominated states as the impetus 
for political economic change does not arise out of the local economic development 
dynamics; instead, it becomes a reflection of international or global developments. There 
is also the promotion of hegemonic consciousness at the global level through the 
universalization of norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of 
behavior for states and for those technological, economic and intellectual forces that act 
across national boundaries. This is undertaken through international organizations and it 
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affects NSI in the sense that the sum of all arrangements governing international issues, 
such as production, finance, security, knowledge, and development, generally termed 
“world order”, influences the development, financing, regulation and protection accorded 
to technology.  
 
Historical structures are frames of reference wherein the trends arising from the 
sequence of outstanding historical events are analyzed in order to explain a technological 
and economic development (or underdevelopment) phenomenon. The component social 
elements or historic bloc are engaged in an interchanging sequence of action and reaction 
indicating the inextricable linkage between politics, economics, and culture at the 
national and global levels. There are rival coalitions of forces in a country, and the 
relationship between more insular nationalist and globalist historic blocs is described as 
both conflictual and cooperative.16 Given that this uneasy ‘alliance’ of forces is historical, 
there is the likelihood of a particular coalition to emerge, flourish, and also fall apart. 
Thus change is possible, and such an impulse could come from any of the component 
forces given that the relationship among them is non-deterministic. 
 
Conceptualizing the broader NSI as an historical structure suggests that global 
capitalist accumulation process are always refracted through the prism of social relations 
and institutions prevailing within nation-states. The implication of Gramsci’s theory of 
the state is that there is historical variability in the creation of states. There are different 
forms of state-society complexes (or expanded state, if you will) which, according to 
Cox, go beyond the blanket typology of strong and weak states. This is crucial to our 
explanation of the varied responses or abilities of nation-states to build technology- and 
innovation-driven production and service sectors. There are traditional as well as modern 
states. A modern state is essential to build an NSI because such a state is more inclined to 
use its political power to extract surplus from its people in the private economic domain 
rather than from the public political domain. By providing an institutional environment 
conducive for owners of private property to use their allocative power to better 
themselves, freedom to use innovativeness and creativity is increased. This fundamental 
synergistic institutional dynamic allows innovative processes to progress. As Erik Reinert 
puts it 
 
 The modern state creates the institutions enabling improvements in 
production and distribution, and creates the incentives that make the vested 
interest of the entrepreneur coincide with the vested interests of society at 
large. Institutions encompass everything from legislation to infrastructure, 
patents to protect new ideas, schools, universities, and standardization of 
units of measurements, for example.17 
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Even though concepts of ‘state’  developed differently in other states, and for this 
reason are not necessarily equivalent to the English concept of ‘state’18, “the inspiration 
for it, in the final analysis”, Greenfeld asserts, came from nationalism, which is 
“incommensurable with a personal government.”19 Serving as “the cohesive factor” of 
overlapping elements of a social formation, a modern state is capable of defining a 
national vision of collective destiny rather than of particular interest. Such a form of state 
is crucial in the integration of forces and institutions necessary not only to reach a certain 
level of technological achievement but to have that achievement reflected in a 
comparable level of innovation, used by society for economic modernization. For this 
reason, Nicos Poulantzas argues, the state becomes the object of “political class struggle” 
which is “the motive force of history”, the “nodal point of the process of 
transformation”.20  
 
Hannes Lacher argues that the variability of nation-states as a social form can be 
analyzed by using property relations rather than production relations as the analytical 
tool.21 Here, property relations refer to the struggle over the control of ‘authoritative’ 
power (or political power) and the ‘allocative’ power (or economic power). The power 
for surplus extraction, through the control over people, is called authoritative resource; 
the control over things and eventually nature is called allocative resource.22 In other 
words, we can determine whether a state is modern (capitalist) or pre-modern (e.g. 
absolutist, patrimonial) by examining the relationship between authoritative and 
allocative powers as far as economic surplus extraction is concerned. In essence, in pre-
modern or pre-capitalist (e.g. absolutist and patrimonial) societies, there is a real unity of 
the political and economic (and cultural) forms of power. The authoritative (i.e., the 
bureaucratic, military, and judicial) powers possessed by the feudal ruling élites were 
used to exploit the peasantries using the state office.23 Lacher argues that the ownership 
of the means of production through the accumulation of authoritative power by lords 
gives them political and legal rights over access to economic surplus, enabling lords to 
reproduce themselves as lords. Economic development then is prevented because the 
logic of wealth accumulation by the ruling élites is not governed by the criteria of 
efficiency of production, rather through coercion or exploitation through extra-economic 
means.24 Hence, Robert Brenner argues that pre-modern property relationships are a 
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the officials represented the king’s authority itself.      
19 Greenfeld, ‘Nationalism and modernity’, p. 26.  
20 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, transl. T. O’Hagan. London: NLB and Sheed and 
Ward, 1973, pp. 76-77. 
21 Hannes Lacher, Beyond Globalization : Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of 
Modernity. London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 51. 
22 Ibid., p. 37. 
23 Richard Lachmann, ‘Comparisons within a single social formation: a critical appreciation of Perry 





hindrance to overall economic development, hence the importance of transforming 
property relations among societies.25  
 
By contrast, Max Weber pointed out that the modern state is distinct from pre-
modern institutions because power relations in the economic and political spheres are 
separated “from all personal authority of individuals”, such as the monarchy and feudal 
warlords and power become “an attribute of the community.”26 A modern state form of 
government, by definition, was impersonal, based on popular mandate rather than on the 
authority of individuals. This idea of the ‘modern state’ is shared by structural historical 
materialists who refer to the modern state as a capitalist state. This form of state, Lacher 
argues, is “autonomous” and “not just relatively”.  He notes: 
 
[Capitalist] states never just codified the prevailing world market 
strategies of firms, nor did they simply execute the global interests of 
‘their’ capitalist classes. States construct social spaces, creating a 
specific nexus between territorially based political authority and the 
different scales of accumulation, from the local to the global. They 
thereby shape and limit possible strategies of firms and classes.27 
 
In a modern or capitalist society, the power to extract surplus is premised on the 
control over property in the means of production located in the market (rather than the 
possession of political authority) which, Lacher argues, is “the decisive aspect in the 
dynamic of productive and commercial development”.28 Labour is transformed as a 
commodity sold in the market or in the private sphere, producing a class of wage-earning 
workers, and the establishment of absolute private property, creating an industrial 
capitalist class. The state is no longer directly implicated in capitalist exploitation 
because of the privatization of some forms of political domination in the economy (or 
market). The privatization of surplus extraction in the economic domain leaves the role of 
the state in the public domain to be the formulation and enforcement of rules for a market 
economy to function.  
 
Ellen Meiksins Wood maintains that Western conceptions of modernity conflate 
the rise of Enlightenment rationalism (the elevation of reason over ignorance and 
superstition) with the development of capitalism.29 This conflation is also reflected in an 
understanding of ‘bourgeois’ as identical to ‘capitalist’.  Capitalism is used in this study 
to differentiate from mercantile capitalism. The latter is the age-old exploitation of price 
differential between segmented markets, buying cheap products in one market to sell at a 
higher price in another, but which creates only opportunities for exchange.  It marked the 
                                               
25 Robert Brenner, ‘The social basis of economic development’, in John E. Roemer (ed.), Analytical 
Marxism. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
26 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich, transl, Ephraim Fischoff et al. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 600, 
998; Liah Greenfeld, ‘Nationalism and modernity’ Social Research 63 (1), Spring 1996, p. 9. 
27 Lacher, Beyond Globalization, p. 155. 
28 Ibid., p. 37. 
29 Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Capitalism or enlightenment?’, History of Political Thought 21 (3), Autumn 




beginning of “the pursuit of ever-increasing wealth” through “profit-oriented production 
for market exchange where it becomes imperative for producers to produce for the 
market”.30 In other words, this distinct type of capitalism emerging is production-oriented 
(and not necessarily equated with industrial capitalism because it actually first developed 
in English farming practices in England). Historical accounts indicate rationalization or 
enlightenment to have not necessarily manifested itself in all time and space in a culture 
of capitalism. For example, in France, the enlightenment idea of ‘progress’ and ‘equality’ 
(e.g., Condorcet) was thought to be achieved through reason, while in England (e.g. 
Locke) progress was paired with ‘industriousness’ closely associated with “productivity 
and profit making”. The 18th-century French bourgeoisie was not an industrial capitalist 
class, but an officeholder, a professional, even an intellectual whose material interests 
were bound up with the state through stipends from the state or through exemption from 
taxes which burdened the Third Estate.31  
 
Essentially, the interest of non-capitalist bourgeois was typically expressed in the 
commitment to civil equality which, more often than not, meant access to state office. 
What is of most significance here is that the culture of the French Enlightenment led to a 
material and institutional interest of the intellectuals toward access to the state, to the 
lucrative resources of state salaries, pensions and privileges. But this was “less a 
symptom of ‘modernity’ than a feature of the ancien régime and the corporate structure 
of the absolutist state…[where] the state and office were primary economic resources.” 
Research projects of those intellectuals or professionals in the Paris Academy, for 
instance, were dictated by the essential functions of the state rather than of the 
economy.32 This means the rationalism and modernity in France did not result in a 
‘capitalist state’.  
 
By contrast, the English bourgeoisie some, of whom were also members of the 
Royal Society as scientists and politicians (e.g. Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, and William 
Petty) came from the landed class, especially from the gentry – men who did not regard 
their intellectual pursuits as a kind of professional activity, let alone a type of office 
holding. The early preoccupation of the Society was with the improvement of the 
agriculture sector through enhanced productivity. One of the Society’s earliest projects 
was a countrywide survey of the technological needs of English farming, which in 17th 
century or earlier was already subjected to the requirements of a competitive market or 
agrarian capitalism. In England the landed were transformed into capitalists and were 
also the political ruling class. The first agrarian capitalist and industrial capitalist systems 
were established first only in England and not in France and the entire Western Europe 
(except Holland) and was presented with a unique ideology of progress based on 
technology, innovation and the enhancement of labour productivity.33  
 
                                               
30 William Welch, ‘In the national interest: interview with Liah Greenfeld’, Vision: Insights and New 
Horizons, Spring 2006, http://www.vision.org/visionmedia/artic le.aspx?id=1329, accessed November 3, 
2007; Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘From opportunity to imperative: the history of the market’, Monthly Review 
46 (3), 1994, pp. 14-26. 
31 Wood, ‘Capitalism or enlightenment?’, p. 408-413. 
32 Ibid., p. 413-17. 





There is nothing self-evident about a modern social formation that supports 
innovation and production systems. The integration process that Freeman underscores 
requires political power. This is where Gramsci’s historic bloc, which constitutes 
interacting political, cultural, and economic elites, is salient because they provide the 
intellectual, political, and economic leadership to develop that system.34 The task of 
intellectuals and other cultural actors is very important in the creation of NSI as they 
develop and sustain mental images to promote the desired norms and achieve 
consensus.35 I then underscore the role of ‘belief-systems’ or ideas in the transformation 
process. Nationalism engenders a developmental mindset, a symptom as well as a cause 
of a modernizing society. Although developmental ruling élites are closely associated 
with the East Asian developmental states, some scholars point out that they have existed 
earlier in history as in England and Western Europe, especially Holland and Germany.36 
Bai Gao points out that ideology or “a way of seeing things” influences the national 
strategy to secure a dynamic economy.37  On this account, ideas are a significant part of 
the NSI as they provide societies with what Margaret Jacob termed a “mental shift”.  
 
A worldview persuades economic and political actors to accept a definition of the 
situation so that the state gains control over the outcomes. How a national problem is 
defined determines the nature of the solution.38 Hence, intellectuals or technocrats, and 
more recently think tanks, are significant actors in establishing NSI, actively integrating 
technological change in economic development discourse. Mark Beeson notes that 
political economic visions not only inform about “what appropriate policy looks like, but 
what an economy is, the way it should be thought of, and the purposes to which it should 
be put.”39 What policymakers envision of an economy and its purpose will “both reflect 
and help to construct the very economic processes and forms policymakers and 
theoreticians seek to comprehend and manage.”40 Whether a national economy is self-
regulating or managed is a national vision that is contested by rival power blocs, i.e. 
nationalist and globalist. 
 
                                               
34 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and transl. Quintin 
Hoare and Gerard Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971, p. 258. 
35 Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony’, p. 132.    
36 See, for example, Amiya Kumar Bagchi, ‘The past and the future of the developmental state’, Journal of 
World-Systems Research 11 (2), Summer/Fall 2000, pp. 398-442; Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the 
Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press, 2002. 
37 Bai Gao, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
38 Ibid., p. 14. Gao argues that the Japanese “economics of industrialization” sees the establishment of 
national production (and innovation) system as the most important policy to establish a strong and globally 
competitive industry. This emphasis on production actually founded on the following solid principles of 
economic management: (1) building an optimal industrial structure (sangyo kozo ); (2) restraining excessive 
competition (kado kyoso ); and (3) trading companies’ short -term profits for labor’s cooperation in 
promoting productivity (seisansei).    
39Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic 
Development. Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave, 2007, p. 144.  




It is the belief-system in a government that is biased towards production, focused 
on creating innovative production and service sectors that is of significance in the 
establishment of NSI because belief-systems shape the way the rulers think about how 
things are to be done. A modern state requires three conditions: (1) an ideology that 
embraces a universe of assumptions, values, and expectations centred on production, 
technological competency, and innovative culture as the means to build a strong national 
economy; (2) the dominance of a capitalist mode of production; and 3) the ability of an 
historic bloc to harness this belief-system as a moving force toward national 
development.  A developmental vision serves as the glue that integrates the actions of 
politicians, businessmen, educators, and the general public with their perception and 
understanding of the national economy.  As Freeman emphasizes, the integration and 
coherence of a society’s institutional elements provides a supporting overall structure for 
rapid diffusion of core leading technologies in clusters of industries.41 The ability of the 
state to promote technological and industrial development largely depends upon its 
relationship with purveyors of technological, political and social power at the national 
and international levels. This relationship is characteristically of a ‘conflict-cooperation’ 
type. The state is involved in ‘games at two levels’ – domestic and global – with each 
game having its own set of rules. At the domestic level, the state is involved in a political 
game to provide a secured and high standard of living for its people, but at another level, 
the international, the state is involved in another game that has its own rules favouring 
market forces.  
 
The idea of collective destiny was expressed by Friedrich List in what is now 
considered his classic book, National System of Political Economy, when he said: “It is 
the task of politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities, to make the small and weak 
ones great and strong, but, above all, to secure to them existence and continuance.”42 And 
to accomplish this task, he adds, requires “the economical development of the nation” for 
the ultimate goal of preparing the national economy “for admission into the universal 
society of the future.” It is clear that List, whose name has been associated with 
protectionism, was actually not against a concept that is presently referred to as 
globalization. Rather, protectionist policies were a temporary strategy until the national 
economy attains a certain level of development of its productive capability. 
 
The intellectual climate in today’s global world, as it was during List’s time, has 
rendered ‘market mechanism’ the ‘new gospel of truth’ in wealth creation and 
‘developmental mechanism’ strangely old-fashioned. The basic argument is that 
economic liberalism promote efficiency in the sense that individuals exercising their 
freedom are given the opportunity to maximize benefits by choosing from the available 
‘commodity’ and ‘capabilities’ options to be able to function. Economic liberalism 
refers to the maximum role of markets and competitive forces in an economy. The 
legitimate role or ‘order policy’ of the state is limited to the establishment of the 
necessary framework in which markets can operate and to the provision of services which 
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private enterprise cannot provide.  These theoretically guarantee price stability, open 
markets, private property, liability and the freedoms of trade, association and contract 
through the establishment of rules to ensure predictability.  
 
In List’s theory of productive powers, he argued that the power of producing 
wealth is more important than wealth itself because “it insures not only the possession 
and the increase of what has been gained, but also the replacement of what has been lost.” 
List, in the present parlance, was arguing for the value of innovation. He explained that 
the cause of a nation’s wealth and progress lies in “productive capabilities” which he 
argues as the “accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfection, and 
exertions of all generations which have lived before us; they form the mental capital of 
the present human race.” For him, free competition between two nations can only be 
mutually beneficial when they compete in a nearly equal position of development. List’s 
words of advice to the developing countries of his time remain applicable today: 
[A]ny nation which owing to misfortunes is behind others in industry, 
commerce, and navigation, while she nevertheless possesses the mental 
and material means for developing those acquisitions, must first of all 
strengthen her own individual powers, in order to fit herself to enter into 
free competition with more advanced nations. 43 
 
Developmentalism (or mercantilism) as originally advanced by List argues that 
nations must modify their system according to the measure or progress they have 
achieved. Free trade with the more advanced nations introduces to a national economy 
the impetus to move from barbarism into making advances in agriculture, after which 
restrictions on commercial activity must be imposed to promote the growth of 
manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade. After a certain level of wealth and 
power has been achieved, free trade and unrestricted competition must be established.  
Essentially, the goal of mercantilism was to align private and public vested interests to 
establish increasing return industries (production and service) that create virtuous circles 
of development by creating wealth, employment, and obtaining synergies between 
agriculture and manufacturing.  When developmentalism is successfully carried out, the 
natural consequence is economic liberalism.44 As Erik Reinert argues, production-
focused mercantilist policies have been “a mandatory passage point for nations that have 
taken the step from poor to wealthy.”  The problem, he says, is that since the early times, 
when the economy is in trouble monetarists try to cure the symptoms evident in the 
financial sphere rather than in industry. Historically, the vicious problems of poverty and 
low productivity and economic growth were only solved by attacking the problem at the 
root – changing the productive structure or by “getting the economic activities right.”  
 
The situation, however, is more complicated in countries that had colonial 
experiences, and thus “multiple spaces of development knowledges”,45 and I would say 
‘multiple nationalisms’ as a condition of movement over-determined by global forces 
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enacted at a local level.  Colonialism, which was motivated by what Amitav Ghosh refers 
to as the “unquenchable, demonic thirst” of colonial powers for the control of trade, land 
and resources complicated the nature, terms and ground of allegiance, and imaginations 
of the political possibilities of local colonized élites.46 Colonialism compromised 
nationalism and the notions of ‘home’, ‘nation’, and ‘belonging’, especially among the 
cosmopolitan indigenous élite which does not necessarily bear nationalist sentiment, as 
Smith points out. 47 In this situation, nationalism as “the foundation of the moral order of 
modern society, the source of its values, the framework of its characteristic – national 
identity, and the basis of social integration in it” is effectively compromised. Nationalism 
becomes élitist rather than collectivist in its goals. Some scholars argue that “there are 
similarities between colonialism and post-colonialism” despite the temporal break 
associated with postwar independence and decolonization.  Franz Fanon’s “useless native 
class” as oppressors of their own people merely replaced the colonial masters.48  In sum, 
the fundamental synergistic dynamic generated in the interaction among material interest, 
and visions and ideas of modernizing political and intellectual leaders largely shapes 
development strategies that allow innovative processes to progress. Such an historic bloc 
embraces the notion that technology and innovation are central to economic change, but 
as social processes their utility in the economy depends not only on technological forces 
and capitalists, but also on other social forces, such as technocrats, politicians and 
educators. A broader NSI is created, thus it is political. 
  
 My answer to the question of ‘lack of political will’ in the Philippines is that the 
long history of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) has entrenched a dominant global 
historic bloc in the country of which the more cosmopolitan Filipino ruling elite is a part. 
To test this main thesis, I proposed the hypothesis that political will is demonstrated 
when a nationalist historic bloc (politicians, intellectuals, and capitalists) uses political 
power to transform a trade- and finance-based economy (pre-capitalist) to a production- 
oriented (capitalist) national economy . This form of capitalism characterized by the 
unique system of market dependence in food production – agrarian capitalism – would 
set in motion a relentless compulsion to compete, to produce cost-effectively, to 
maximize profit, to re-invest surpluses, and systematically to increase labour-productivity 
through innovation and by improving the productive forces.  
 
Agrarian capitalism, which had completely transformed the most basic human 
relations and practices, had impacted a dynamic English economy in the 17th century and 
would eventually give rise to capitalism in its mature, industrial form in late 18th-century 
England. It was when nationalism was translated into ‘scientism’ (different from the 20th-
century scientism) and innovativeness, and the widespread application of mechanical 
skills and considerable creativity in conception and design in machines that capitalism 
had matured, and the English economy was dominated by industrial capitalists. By 
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contrast, in the Philippines what links the present to the past is the dominance of 
cosmopolitan traders and financiers backed by imperial political rulers. From the Spanish 
period, the Philippine economy has always been characterized by balance-of-payment 
crises, mass poverty, and low productivity. The Philippines until today is not a modern 
political economy. The political, economic, and cultural structures can be traced back to 
Spanish Philippines. While most development scholars take the post-World War II period 
as the ‘new beginning’ for most of the countries in the developing world, Atul Kohli 
considers this as unfortunate because “it is likely that a significant component of the 
explanation for why the countries traverse different developmental paths lie in their 
colonial heritage.”49  
   
The origins of trade and financial economic interest   
 
I discuss the origins of the mercantile and financial economy dominated by the 
Spanish merchants [both in colonial Philippines and New Spain (now Mexico)] and the 
Chinese merchants. Spain ruled the Philippines, its only colony in Asia, through the 
viceroy of Mexico. I then go on to examine the continuity and changes of this material 
interest in mid 18th century through late 19th century when Spain was under the English 
sphere of influence. At that time the mercantile forces were dominated by English and 
American merchants and they were joined by the emerging landed Filipino élite engaged 
in export-crop businesses. At this time the economy was strongly linked with American 
markets.  Free trade devastated the pre-colonial society’s growing agriculture and 
traditional industry. The decimation of local entrepreneurship and a conservative Spanish 
colonial education’s long-lasting consequences for the marginalization of primordial 
industrial forces are discussed.  
 
Spain in the early modern period was a leading imperial power in Europe and 
beyond. At the height of Spain’s greatness, it had established its institutions and social 
forces in its vast colonial domains, including the Philippines. However, Spain ruled the 
Philippines through the viceroy of Mexico, prompting one scholar to say that “From the 
beginning, Spanish colonization of the Philippines was a Mexican enterprise”.50 While 
the occupation was a “fiscal nightmare for the Spanish administration in the Philippines, 
for the viceregal authorities of Mexico, and for the Castilian crown in Madrid”51, it was a 
period of enormous profit-making and enrichment for merchants and financiers engaged 
in import-export business. More than that, however, it created an enduring economic 
structure which entrenched mercantile and financial interests in the local economy until 
today. 
  
The politics of Spanish colonization of the Philippines were influenced by and 
intertwined with broader imperial, strategic, political, cultural, and commercial goals in 
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the Asia-Pacific. As early as 1569 a controversy arose among opposing coalitions of 
government officials and friars over the practicality of the colonial occupation. Those 
who were opposed argued that it was a losing proposition as far as the exploitative 
potential and financial viability were concerned, as it was a “deficit government”, 
receiving a yearly situado (subsidy) from the wealthier Mexico.52 However, if the 
occupation was to be maintained, converting the Philippine Islands into a trading post 
was a must.53 The Philippines was held as a colony from 1565 until 1898 not only to use 
the archipelago as “a center of missionary effort in the Orient”. In the minds of the 
Spanish authorities, Las Islas Filipinas were “absolutely necessary”: “to maintain the 
authority, grandeur, and reputation of [the Spanish] crown”, to serve as a “defense of the 
Moluccas and the spice trade”, and “to protect for both crowns [Castilla and Portugal] the 
commerce of China.”54   
  
The entrenchment of trade interests in Spanish Philippines was influenced by the 
much-coveted and burgeoning foreign-trade dynamic surrounding the Chinese silver 
trade and the Moluccas spice trade. The Spanish officials saw the Philippines’ continued 
occupation as crucial to their success in the struggle against the Dutch and Portuguese 
merchants for control over the Moluccas spice trade.55 Moreover, it was to preserve for 
both Castilian and Portuguese crowns the “commerce of China” that Spain maintained 
the Philippines as its colony.56 The galleon trade was regarded as “one of the most 
beneficial and lucrative of those in the entire Orient”. In fact, the strength of this import-
export business had so impressed the Italian Gemelli Careri, who visited the Philippines 
in 1696 that he stated that Manila “was to be accounted one of the greatest places of trade 
in the world”.57 The galleon trade was significant for Spain to maintain and preserve – 
“For if they were lost”, as Grau argued in his memorial, “the resulting damage would be 
great and excessive beyond any possible comparison or proportion to what the islands 
now cost us.”58  
 
Manila was crucial to the global trading process.59 For some 250 years the 
galleons provided the link of a bustling trade driven by China’s unlimited demand for 
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silver from Mexico and Peru and Europe’s demand for Chinese finished goods, such as 
porcelain wares, silk, and tea. Some scholars argue that this was a significant period as it 
ushered in a new era of world trade linking an existing sophisticated Asian commercial 
network centred on China with an expanding European world system.60  Between the 
1500s and the 1800s, a third or about 40 percent of all the silver produced by Peru and 
Mexico, which supplied about 85 percent of the world’s demand, flowed into China.61 
 
China’s emperor repulsed embassies seeking to establish trade, stating that “the 
Celestial Empire, ruling all within the four seas [i.e., the world], simply concentrates on 
carrying out the affairs of Government properly, and does not value rare and precious 
things”, yet “there was one exception: silver.”62 The Chinese market for coins was what 
elevated the value of the silver commodity and provided the impetus for trade around the 
globe63, thus Katherine Bjork contends that the Asian trade was not external to the world 
system: “Silver was one medium of the European world system that had a place in 
Chinese world system schemes.”64  The Chinese ‘silver interest’ was matched with the 
Spanish merchants’ (both in the Philippines and Mexico) interests to control the 
monopolistic galleon trade. The keen interests of the merchants made the Manila-
Acapulco trade not only endure but also prosper. However, it placed the Spanish crown in 
a difficult situation where it was torn between “maintaining a foothold in Asia”, which 
meant tolerating or even encouraging the galleon trade, and protecting the metropolitan 
merchants or curbing the flow of silver to China. The merchants of Seville who 
dominated the Atlantic trade in European goods had always been opposed to the 
colonization of the Philippines because the Chinese merchandise carried by the Manila-
Acapulco galleons, particularly Chinese silk “undersold those of Spain in Mexico and 
                                               
60 Curtin used the concept of “transit market” to describe the function of Manila in “linking a Chinese trade 
diaspora” with the galleons from Mexico. Philip D. Curtin, Cross Cultural Trade in World History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 134. Bjork was of the opinion that the triangular 
relationship between Spain, New Spain, and the Philippines was determined not by the “dynamics of an 
emerging European world system”. She argues that “Spain and its colonies were affected by the logic – 
cultural as well as economic – of the Chinese world system, in which the Pacific trade played a part.” 
Bjork, ‘The link that kept the Philippines Spanish’, p. 26. This position was consistent with Flynn’s and 
Giráldez’s where they argue that the Europeans participated “in a vast and sophisticated existing Asian 
commercial network”. Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, ‘Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: the origin of world 
trade in 1571’, Journal of World History 6 (2), 1995, p. 217. Pomeranz and Wong, on the other hand, argue 
that “there were important dynamics of expansion common to areas within each of these large regions 
[Eirope and China]” but they don’t claim “that either Europe as a whole or China as a whole was changing 
in a lockstep fashion.” Ken Pomeranz and Bin Wong, ‘China and Europe: 1500-2000 and Beyond: What is 
Modern”?’ http.afe.easia.columbia.edu/chiinawh/web/s5/s5_4.html.  
61 Pomeranz and Wong point out that over this period, the huge Chinese population and a dynamic and 
commercially sophisticated economy needed a medium of exchange – money. This led to the invention of 
paper money during the Song dynasty, however later when China got into a fiscal crisis the Chinese people 
lost trust on it because the Chinese government solved the crisis by printing more money. Silver coinage 
replaced as a medium of exchange.  
62 Marshall Sahlins, ‘Cosmologies of capitalism: the trans-pacific sector of the world system’, Proceedings 
of the British Academy 74 (1988), p. 10 cited by Bjork, ‘The link that kept the Philip pines Spanish’, pp. 30-
31.  
63 Flynn and Giráldez, ‘Born with a Silver Spoon’, p. 206; Pomeranz and Wong, ‘China and Europe’, 
http://afe.easia.columbia,edu/chinawh/web/s5/s5_4b.html.   




Peru”.65 In Grau’s memorial he notes that “the Chinese goods were so cheap that those of 
Castilla were estimated at three times their price.”66 
The steep competition from Chinese products prompted Philip II to abolish the 
galleon trade in order to “protect Spanish industry and to preserve to Spanish producers 
the American market.” A succession of decrees was then made by the crown to the 
viceroy of Mexico. In 1587 the shipment of Chinese cloths from Mexico to Peru was 
prohibited. In 1591 all direct trade between Peru or other parts of South America and 
China and the Philippines was banned, and in 1593 a decree, not rigorously enforced till 
1604 “absolutely limited the trade between Mexico and the Philippines to $250,000 
annually for the exports to Mexico, and to $500,000 for the imports from Mexico.”67 The 
suspension of the trade link was “very injurious to the Philippines” as “the islands have 
experienced so great a decline in their commerce.”68 The King pointed out: “if that trade 
[Manila-Acapulco] continues, the trade in cloth exported from these realms would cease 
or be greatly decreased.” Also, the textiles “are bartered only for gold and silver, or coin, 
because there is abundance of everything else there”, which means that Spain loses “that 
whole amount”. But despite the strong opposition of producers in Spain trade has been 
continued.  Bjork maintains that this was largely because of the commercial interests of 
both Mexican officials and merchants who “were in a position to control the trade for 
their benefit.”69 Edicts were not always enforced, as William Lytle Schurz points out: 
“Seldom was the execution of any group of laws in the colonial code of the empire 
insisted on with equal persistence or rigor.”70  
 
In the minds of some colonial authorities, Spain did not benefit from the trade. 
They thought the galleon trade siphoned silver to China. Concerned about the flow of 
silver to China and the strength of Chinese merchants, the auditor, Melchor Davalos, 
wrote Philip II in 1584 informed the King of the situation. 71 Efforts to prevent the 
continuous flow of silver to China led an ‘Ordinance Forbidding the Indians to Wear 
Chinese Stuffs’. The governor Juan de Cuellar argued that the purchase by native 
Filipinos of Chinese garments carries away 200,000 pesos: “This money leaves the 
realms of his Majesty, and is carried to a foreign country, in violation of royal edicts; this 
would be prevented if the said natives were not to clothe themselves with the said 
stuffs.”72 Moreover, the Ordinance was seen by the governor to be important to stop the 
exportation of raw materials from the Philippines for China’s industries: In prohibiting 
the Filipino ‘Indians’ from wearing Chinese cloths “another serious evil would cease; the 
natives would no longer sell raw cotton to the Chinese, who take it to their own country 
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and make it into cloth, and then return to sell it to the natives, and with these goods 
deprive them of their money.”73  
 
The intertwining of trade and financial interests in the Philippines began during 
the Spanish regime. Nicholas Cushner notes that a financial-cum-philanthropic 
organization, Santa Hermandad y Cofradia de la Misericordia (Misericordia of Manila) 
was established.74 The primary sources of the Misericordia’s income came from 
donations, estates, legacies in the form of obras pias (charitable foundation), taxes on 
property, and tributes from the encomiendas. The income was apportioned three ways: 
one part was lent to the Spanish merchants involved in the Manila galleon trade; one part 
was used to finance the Chinese Asian trade, and one part was used as reserve capital.75 
At the end of the 18th century, the Misericordia was a powerful economic force in the 
Philippines: “Instead of being a simple source of charitable works, it was the financial 
motor of the galleon trade”. Some of its resources were invested as stocks in the Banco 
Español-Filipino (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) established in 1852. The Catholic 
friars’ financial investments in Hong Kong which siphoned money from the Philippines 
were the object of attacks by the young Filipino ilustrados in their propaganda writings.76 
These arguments, Megan Thomas points out, “are surprisingly familiar to an early 
twenty-first-century ear: friar orders were accused of being transnational corporations 
(which they literally were), with loyalty to no nation, and which could, therefore, escape 
obligations to any nation.”77  
 
The arrival of the Spaniards and the presence of a lucrative market for Chinese 
goods both for the domestic economy and the galleon trade drew the Chinese to settle in 
the Philippines in the early 1580s.78 Ship-owning Chinese merchants seized the 
prospects. This trade route was very profitable for the Chinese especially from the 1570s 
to 1670s.79 There was, however, an uneasy relationship between the Spanish government 
and the Chinese due to cultural, economic, and political reasons which resulted in the 
Spanish government discriminating against the Chinese traders. Policies towards them 
were characterized by heavy and arbitrary taxation, control, and conversion.  There were 
also episodes of Chinese expulsion from the islands in 1686, 1744, 1755, and in 1766 
following Chinese collaboration with the English during the invasion of the Philippines in 
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1762-64. Only the native women and their Chinese mestizo children and a few Catholic 
Chinese were allowed to remain. Nonetheless, the colonial government reopened the 
colony to Chinese immigrants and business activities in 1778. A high-ranking Spanish 
official, Tavora, wrote to King Philip IV: “the country cannot get along without the 
infidel Sangleys [Chinese], for they are the ones who bring us food from China.”80 The 
Chinese brought practically everything that was needed in the local economy – from 
cotton, silk yarn and cloth, paper, umbrellas, crockery, porcelain, dried and fresh fruits, 
spices, salt, meat, furniture, iron, jewelry, tea, wheat flour, gunpowder, nails and metals. 
Why the local economy was unable to supply the local needs will be explained later. 
 
As part of the Seven Years War, the English occupied Manila between 1762 and 
1764.81 Manila was made open to Western ships and Spanish Philippines was 
incorporated within the sphere of influence of the British Empire. After English 
occupation ended, and Spanish government power was regained in Manila in 1766, the 
free trade regime started by the English in 1762 was strengthened by the restored Spanish 
government; this allowed the legal entry of imported goods carried by European ships, 
although it was believed that European and American cargoes had been imported to the 
Philippines illegally. Moreover, Spain in mid 18th century was in decline and in deep 
turmoil. Guided by the Bourbon monarchs’ ‘enlightened’ policies, Spain instituted 
reforms in its colonies including the Philippines. From 1764 to 1787, an internal 
economic development policy was instituted in the colony’s economy. The Spanish 
Governor-General José de Basco y Vargas was a product of Spain’s middle class and a 
firm believer in a professionally-based commercial society. His philosophy of economic 
development “was based on the exploitation of colonial products and the liberalization of 
foreign trade” to allow foreign competitors to the galleon trade.82  
 
When the English occupied Manila, foreign businessmen other than the Spanish 
“entered the market for Philippine agricultural produce and pushed up land values by 
making it profitable for landowners to specialize and produce [crops] for the export 
markets.”83 This benefited the landed Chinese mestizos and native indios. As the Chinese 
were expelled from the colony, a group of Chinese-Filipino mestizos and native indios 
who were landed and engaged in export crop production “took over the role of economic 
middlemen”. The Chinese-Filipino mestizos and native indios were to become the local 
Filipino political and intellectual elites known as ilustrados whose economic interest was 
in the export of crops. I will discuss this later. Outside of Manila, the mestizos and rich 
indios were involved in buying agricultural produce from native farmers and selling it in 
Manila.84 In fact, the openings of Sual port in Central Luzon, Iloilo in the Visayas, and 
Zamboanga in Mindanao in 1855, and Cebu port in 1860 were largely due to the Chinese 
mestizos’ export-crop activity. Soon after the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, two more 
Philippine ports were opened for foreign entry in 1874: Legazpi in south Luzon and 
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Tacloban in Leyte. Peter W. Stanley points out that from 1850 to 1893 sugar exports 
largely produced by the landed mestizos, indios and Spaniards, financed by English and 
American commercial houses in Manila, multiplied 600 times, with the US as the major 
market.85  The stimulus for the development of these plantations in the Philippines was 
provided by “advances of American capital”, and these foreign capital infusions 
redirected the local economic activity towards the production of export crops. 
 
It became increasingly clear in the 19th century that Spain had ceased to be a great 
world empire and had only marginal status in Europe. Its non-inclusion in the Concert of 
Europe was indicative of its stature in world politics. As Spain’s new liberal regime was 
unstable, it had to depend on France and Britain for financial, military, and diplomatic 
support. In other words, Spain was within the French and English political and diplomatic 
spheres of influence.86 This, of course, had repercussions on Spain’s ambition to gain 
more liberal access to the Chinese market and its dealings with the Philippines, especially 
the further entrenchment of trade and financial interests in the colony. The restrictive 
Spanish policy towards the Chinese eased out with the removal in 1828 of mobility taxes 
imposed only upon Chinese importers. With this policy reversal, “the Chinese were 
continuing to gravitate toward mercantile occupations”, and the Spanish government was 
resigned to the idea that it could encourage the Chinese to go into agriculture, which was 
central to the debate between the Spanish conservatives and liberals on how “to 
encourage Chinese assistance in Philippine economic development.87 The ‘new’ policy 
also inaugurated a more liberal policy toward the Chinese in terms of mobility within the 
colony. Instead of being confined only to Manila, they were allowed to penetrate the 
entire archipelago, and become actively involved in local trade and distribution. After the 
1840s, the Chinese dominated domestic marketing and distribution in cooperation with 
English and American firms.88 As the Philippine economy grew, particularly in the 
1850s, coffee, sugar, and coconut oil began to be exported. The Chinese traders acted as 
wholesalers, distributors, purchasing agents and money-lenders for English and American 
merchant firms.89 As middlemen, they controlled not only the marketing of local 
agricultural production, but also the flow of consumer goods imported into the country 
through retail trade. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese population increased in the abaca-
producing provinces such as Albay, Leyte, Samar, Cebu and Camarines Sur, in the sugar-
producing areas of Iloilo and Negros Occidental, and in the tobacco growing areas of 
Cagayan and Isabela.90 The opening of several domestic ports in the colony ensured the 
penetration of imported products to the farthest corner of the domestic economy. A head 
of an European importing firm in Manila said of the Chinese distributors and purchasing 
agents: 
The firms here, with very few exceptions, only sell in Manila and to the Chinese, 
who are the intermediaries for the provinces…For importers and exporters it 
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would have not been possible to do any work at all; in fact, the trade of the 
islands, small as it is compared to what it might be, has depended entirely upon 
the Chinese, because on one side they sell to the men in the interior, and barter 
with the natives for produce in exchange for imports—you will see the Chinese 
hawker everywhere; he will go to the last nook and corner, and he will offer his 
goods…A European cannot work outside here for any length of time.91 
 
The major player in the 19th-century Philippine economy was principally English 
and American businessmen, which controlled the import-export, insurance, shipping, 
banking, and real estate businesses. Firms such as Ker, McMicking & Co., Wise & Co., 
George W. Hubbell (later Peele, Hubbell & Co.) which originally functioned as 
commission houses had diversified their activities, Stanley notes.92  Anglo-American 
trade and financial interests began to dominate the economy. According to Benito 
Legarda, Jr.: 
 
They…traded on their own account; were agents for marine, fire and life 
insurance companies; were agents or consignees of shipping lines, or 
shipowners; owned shares in such enterprises as cordage works, banks, 
and slipways; owned real estate, including plantations; engaged in foreign 
exchange operations; and, most interesting of all, received funds at interest 
and made advances…the key function of the Anglo-American 
entrepreneurs in Manila was banking.93 
 
Established in 1873, two English merchant banks – the Chartered Bank of India, 
Australia and China and the HSBC (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) – 
were responsible for the expansion of commercial businesses undertaken by the English-
American in alliance with the Chinese.94 In fact, credit availability often spelled the 
difference between financial success and failure for many a member of the Chinese 
community, Irene Jensen argues. The English and American firms served as guarantors 
for bank loans to the Chinese for their commercial operations. The Chinese traders were 
mainly concerned with the distribution of manufactured products, especially textiles. 
Also, the bank provided a crucial service to the Chinese traders in supplying information 
on new foreign markets for exports and firms keen to import to the Philippines.95 The 
organization of credit in conjunction with the distribution and marketing of both imports 
and exports, known as the cabecilla-agent system, ensured a Chinese monopoly.96 The 
cabecillas, or wholesale merchants, established themselves in Manila and created a 
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network of agents in the provinces.97 This loose organization of wholesalers ensured that 
the Chinese presented a united front when bargaining with the European importers, which 
allowed them to control prices. The cabecilla-agent system made the rival Chinese 
mestizo business less profitable, causing them to shift their interests from commerce to 
agriculture.  
 
Nicholas Cushner argues that the many centuries of “preoccupation with a simple 
exchange trade had formed a mentality in economic affairs which preferred heavy 
investment with quick and large returns”.98 The trading activity did not have substantial 
and rapid returns to create sufficient wealth for the Spanish government in the colony, 
which had to be supported by an annual subsidy from Mexico. Writing in 1788, Francisco 
Muñoz y San Clemente succinctly described the problem of private wealth concentration 
in a trade-based economy in that only a fraction went to the government coffers and most 
of the proceeds were “in the hands of the biggest merchants”; the poor natives, he adds, 
“get nothing but a tiny share of it, in payment for the items” they sell. He concludes “It is 
therefore not surprising that the native lives in a state of indolent activity, tilling only the 
bit of land sufficient to feed his family and supply the local market.”99 This supports the 
thesis that a commercial economic structure which is based on the exploitation of price 
differentials between segmented markets rather than through production had only 
concentrated wealth on a few.100 Effective wealth creation depends on the material 
capabilities of a country. An economy that relies heavily on trading rather than a robust 
agriculture and industry does not benefit most of the people because trade does not create 
mass employment opportunities. The establishment of import-export economic activity in 
Spanish Philippines would not have been possible without a corresponding ideational 
structure. Free trade led to the devastation of the growing agriculture and proto-industry 
sectors and the demise of local entrepreneurship.  
 
The Spaniards accused the native indios of indolence, but Antonio de Morga’s 
accounts belied this claim. Before the conquest, the native population, both men and 
women, were engaged not in idleness but in profitable agricultural and home-based craft 
industries.101 Moreover, the natives were entrepreneurial and possess the drive for profit-
making.102 The natives also had the capability to make products which were unique and 
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expensive, and were sought out by their Japanese customers. This shows that they had 
creative potential. A domestic and international trade with Japan, China, Cambodia, and 
other neighbouring countries existed which indicates the natives’ entrepreneurial 
activities. The natives produced earthenware jars (tibores), which were sold to the 
Japanese for great sum of money and are used for planting their tea plant and adorn them 
elegantly in their inner rooms and chambers. 103 In fact, in Grau’s letter to the East Indies 
Council in 1640, he indicated that there were commodities “produced and manufactured 
in the Philipinas Islands”, such as talingas (Ilocos blanket), table-covers, and lampotes 
(pieces of cotton canvas) which were included in the galleon trade.104 In Sebu, Morga 
notes, the natives “were less given to agriculture but they are skilled in navigation..” 
Panay, which is located in the same middle-islands region (as Sebu) hosts natives who 
had primitive engineering skills – “who are masters in building all kinds of ships…[and] 
are highly skilled carpenters. They have no other trade than this, and though there is not a 
single tree of any size in all the island yet they practise this art with great competence.”105 
But these were all gone. In Morga’s account: 
 
The native Indians are very far from exercising those trades, and have 
even forgotten much of farming, and the raising of fowls, cattle, and 
cotton, and the weaving of cloth, which they used to do in the days of 
their paganism and for a long time after the conquest of the country 
[emphasis added].106 
 
Why had the natives forgotten their trades and entrepreneurial skills? Seeking to 
understand the myth of the “lazy native”, Jóse Rizal, the Philippines national hero, sought 
to reconstruct precolonial Philippine society and culture as basis for his assessment of the 
impact of Spanish colonialism. He launched a nationalist project to reclaim the history of 
his country. He devoted a four-month intensive research of the accounts of Spanish 
chroniclers in the English Museum in 1889, from the coming of Magellan (Pigafetta) to 
the early years of the Spanish regime (Morga, Chirino, Colin, de San Agustin, Combes, 
etc.) and compared these with the more modern anthropological, ethno-historical, and 
ethnolinguistic studies of European, mostly German, orientalists.107 He understood the 
causes. Rizal argued that: 
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The coming of the Spaniards to the Filipinas, and their government, 
together with the immigration of the Chinese, killed the industry and 
agriculture of the country. The terrible competition of the Chinese with 
any individual of another race is well known, for which reason the United 
States and Australia refuse to admit them. Argensola says the same thing, 
and could not have copied Morga, since their works were published in the 
same year, in countries very distant from one another, and the two contain 
wide differences”[emphasis added].108 
 
In the present parlance, politics and economics cannot be separated in any real 
sense and the domestic and international spheres were intimately linked. The bottom line 
is that Spain was not modern. Under the colonial rule, the monumental task of 
modernizing the Philippines was on the shoulders of the Spanish authorities. However, 
Spain was incapable of modernizing its colony because as Stanley reminds us, it was also 
“mired in an impotent traditionalism of its own.” He asked, “How was Spain to lead a 
colony to the modernization and cultural integration that eluded it at home?”109 There 
was an “absence of the spirit of progress” and “hostility to new ideas” in 16th-century 
Spain.110 The European enlightenment had a different outcome in 17th-century Spain than 
England. Similar with France, rationalization or the idea of “progress” and “equality” in 
Spain created a bureaucratic class whose idea of wealth creation was bound up with state 
privileges. Foremost of these privileges is the use of state office to extract surplus from 
the peoples. As Wood contends this is far from being a symptom of a modernizing state. 
It is a feature of an old regime and a fused political economic structure of a ‘transitional 
state’ “where the state and office were the primary economic resources.”111 Essentially, 
the interest of a non-modern bourgeois was typically expressed in the commitment to 
civil equality which, more often than not, meant access to state office. Thus, it was not a 
surprise that “financial corruption honeycombed the whole colonial civil service” and a 
remarkable policy failure to develop resources and to provide an environment conducive 
for the development of the local industry characterized the non-modern colonial 
government in Spanish Philippines.112  
 
The competition for the China trade and the ambition to Catholicize East Asia 
constitute the thread that connects all the political actions and manoeuvrings, and 
produced enduring undesirable consequences on the colony. The first was unfair 
competition or monopolistic control of credit and marketing considerably de-motivated 
the locals to continue and improve their profitable pre-colonial economic activities. 
Unfair competition from the China trade which was funded by ‘transnational’ Spanish 
merchants and financiers in Manila and Mexico resulted in the decline of the locals’ pre-
Spanish trade between other neighbouring countries such as Japan, Siam, and India.113  
However, Rizal notes, “With the exception of trade with China, the relations with the 
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other nations had ceased more than two centuries.114 “In Morga’s time, Rizal adds, the 
Philippines exported silk to Japan whence now [1889] comes the best quality of that 
merchandise.”115 Morga did not explain why the natives abandoned their trades and 
economic activity, “preferring to live in poverty”. I would argue that the natives had 
control over the pre-Spanish trading activity and it was directly connected to their own 
productive activity. Suddenly, all these were lost. Profit – the economic motive, if you 
will – was no longer in the control of the natives’ hands. Crop production and home-
based crafts were a useless economic activity for them as profits were concentrated in the 
hands of the middlemen, such as the Chinese traders and the Chinese mestizos and indios 
who had a monopoly on local buying and selling. This monopolistic control over local 
trade generated ethnic hatred and violence directed against the Chinese. The hostile 
attitude and negative sentiments of the local people was reflected in their involvement in 
the occasional massacres of Chinese traders. They lodged complaints with the 
government stating that: 
 
The Spaniards advanced them [Chinese traders] money for their 
transactions in commerce and their traffic in the country, what they call 
their capital. They have obtained from the natives in the provinces 
everything that they wanted, they have lived quietly in the towns, they 
have been served in their persons, they have lived in large, comfortable 
houses, they have brought in whatever merchandise they wanted at prices 
agreeable to them, they have been paid in silver or coin according to the 
values which they have set for their particular transactions, all of which 
has been to their great profit and benefit…”116 
 
The situation of the local economy had provoked debates among the liberals and 
the conservatives within the Spanish government. The liberals believed that the 
encouragement of Chinese immigrants and their subsequent dispersion throughout the 
colony would benefit the economy. They contended that “exposure to Chinese 
competition would teach the indio the value of hard work …the Chinese in every town 
would serve as a stimulus and an education to him [indio]”.117 Ardent conservatives 
decried the liberal policy, arguing that this obsession with the Chinese to provide the 
revenue to fill the government treasuries was a fundamental contradiction to the Spanish 
religious-cultural and economic obligations of protecting the indios from the Chinese. 
They deplored the policy because it was pursued “even at the cost of converting the 
archipelago into a Chinese colony with a Spanish flag”.118 The Archbishop of Manila, 
Don Carlos Bermudez de Castro, argued that the natives’ failure to take over the 
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businesses of the Chinese was not because they were lazy.119 Moreover, Justice Calderon 
Henriquez argued that “it was not because the natives were useless but because the 
Chinese confederated among themselves so that they did not mind losing a thousand 
pesos to bankrupt a few men who tried to get into a new business”.120 The Chinese had 
ready access to credit because they were linked with Spanish capital. Such was a 
structure that could have been corrected had the colonial government been 
developmental. Second was the policy of military conquest to control the Moluccas spice 
trade which resulted in the decline of native population and waste of human and financial 
resources.121 Third, the trading economy dominated by global merchants and financiers 
was a structural constraint that channelled the entrepreneurial activity of an emerging 
local élite to trade. The mestizos shifted from financing the home-based weaving industry 
to export-crop production when the former was no longer a viable business because of the 
competition from cheap imports. Morga criticized the colonial government for neglecting 
the development of the economy by focusing on the China trade. He took note of the 
many economic opportunities by which wealth could have been generated by the colonial 
government.122  
 
Evidently, a trade-based economy marginalized the development of the 
agriculture and industry sectors. Aside from the merchants, Chinese artisans from the 
southern provinces of China also came to settle in the Philippines, and they brought with 
them technology in boat-building, furniture-making, manufacture of boilers, shoes, soap, 
and dyes, in smelting, masonry, and foundry working.123 They also introduced sugar-
refining technology and equipment, new construction techniques, movable-type printing 
and bronze making or metal working. The opportunity to build an industry using this 
segment of the Chinese immigrants and learn from the technologies to improve the 
primitive skills of the natives was not provided. The absence of modernizing Spanish 
bureaucrats failed to channel Chinese entrepreneurial activity into industry. Fourth, the 
free trade policy in Spanish Philippines dealt a devastating blow to the rural craft 
industry. In mid 18th century an ‘enlightened despotism’ in Europe led to reforms in 
Spain and its colony. Spain was in deep turmoil, but the liberal Spanish reformers 
believed that ineffective and corrupt government was the fundamental reason why 
revenues from the colonies were inadequate for imperial defence, and why Spanish 
commerce had dwindled. Strong governance was seen as the answer to this problem. 
There is thus no change in the arguments of present day liberal regime promoters. In 
large part, corruption was responsible for Spain’s economic difficulties, but the major 
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contributor to Spain’s declining political power was its stagnating economy, which was 
characterized by lack of productivity and competitiveness, exacerbated by ten years of 
unsuccessful wars (with France 1793-1795 and with England 1796-1802) and the later 
unstoppable revolts in its American colonies.124  
 
Many scholars have described Spain’s economy as backward and failed 
industrialization. As one author notes, Spain’s failed industrialization was based on its 
“inability to reproduce the English model” of industrialization; among the contributing 
endogenous factors were backward Spanish agriculture and a lacklustre industry.”125 
Reinert (2007), however, points out that Spain’s policy is a “frightening example of what 
not to do.” He notes: “The discovery of the America’s led to immense quantities of gold 
and silver flowing into Spain. These huge fortunes were not invested in productive 
systems but actually led to the de-industrialization of the country.”126 England was 
already producing goods at a record high productivity with the introduction of machines 
and factories, thus Spain’s and its colonies’ trade-based economy could not compete on 
an equal footing. Spanish intellectuals “believed that the only way to pull their huge yet 
impoverished empire together was to make each and every part of it contribute to the 
whole the commodities it could best produce or manufacture.”127 In other words, these 
intellectuals believed comparative advantage could draw Spain from the economic 
quagmire. But trade is based on the premise that those economies engaged in trading 
have a production sector competitively producing whatever product they could 
manufacture. This was not the case in Spain and Spanish Philippines. Even before the 
English-Spanish war, Horacio de la Costa points out, there were those in the Spanish 
bureaucracy who believed that some radical change in the structure of Philippine trade 
was necessary to meet the altered conditions of world trade.128 One of the main reasons 
for the change was the steep competition that Asian products encountered with those 
produced from Europe. As de la Costa argues: “It  would seem, then, that the old system 
of buying cheap from Asia and selling dear to America, which is what the galleon trade 
was in essence, had seen its day…The Philippines could not continue merely as a center 
of transhipment and survive.”129  
 
To correct the problem, the Spaniards created the Economic Society of Friends of 
Manila (Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Manila) in 1781 to encourage local 
enterprise. It helped to establish a traditional textile industry by installing 300 looms for 
tapestry and cloth production for domestic consumption. The industry produced 
quantities of blue-and-white checked cloth, and 50-60,000 blankets between 1785 and 
1795 in the hope of gaining a share of the profits of Asian trade for Spain, at that point 
dominated by the Dutch, English, and French. The new economic policy promoted an 
agrarian economy and home-based or artisan handicraft and service activities such as 
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spinning and weaving of cloth, processing and milling of rice, the manufacture of 
assorted implements, and so forth.130 The production of cash crops for export, such as 
indigo, sugar, abaca, rice, maize, cocoa, spices, cotton and tobacco, was intended to 
increase revenues for the government. It was during this period that haciendas emerged: 
large tracts of land devoted to agricultural production for export.131 Indigo or añil, a dye, 
which was sought after by the European textile industry, was a much desired product. 
Basco also promoted increased activity in mining iron, copper and gold.  In the hand-
woven textile industry, Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo notes that Ilocos’ beautiful woven 
cotton cloth was highly priced in Mexico; Laguna produced excellent stockings, and 
specialized handkerchiefs and ribbons were produced in Tondo. All these goods were 
made “by those whom the Spaniards called useless natives”.132 Clothing made from 
natural fibers, such as sinamay, jusi, and piña, had entered the international market and 
achieved remarkable levels of volume and sophistication. For example, the local weaving 
industry accounted for a total of $720,500 in 1855.133 Impressed by the variety of natural 
fiber materials and colors that were produced, a French scholar who made a systematic 
survey of the Philippine weaving industry remarked: “the combination of their designs 
and colours is so bright and varied that they have the admiration of the whole world”.134  
Even the English vice-consul, Nicholas Loney, was not oblivious to the thriving industry, 
as indicated in his consular report of April 1857.135 
 
However, the ‘infant’ local industry practically vanished. The free trade regime 
established by the colonial government simply had the local economy flooded with 
imported goods made available by Chinese merchants to the remotest towns and villages. 
An open economy that did not integrate policies to help build a fledgling local industry 
was a recipe for destruction. The liberal regime adopted by the Spanish reformers 
exposed the local industry to foreign competition at a time when Britain was producing 
its cotton goods using advanced mechanical technologies, which enormously improved 
its productivity. The primitive industry, of course, could not compete. All these 
incoherent policies were neatly captured by Francisco Xavier Salgado in his letter to 
Antonio Porlier in 1769. He points out that during his more than three decades of stay in 
the country, there were many obstacles he thought were hindering development: (1) the 
citizens lack capital; (2) those who do have capital employ it in nothing but imported 
goods, whether for re-export on the galleon or for sale in the domestic market; (3) 
security risks for investors outside of Manila; (4) underdeveloped transportation and 
communication problems of an archipelago.136  
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The result of the policy failure was the absence of a productive sector and a 
dynamic domestic market for about 2.5 million Filipinos in mid 18th-century. The 
severely-affected putting-out system brought economic destitution for thousands in the 
traditional weaving villages. Local capital, particularly from the Chinese mestizos shifted 
from textiles to commercial agriculture, which displaced the entrepreneurial skills and 
labour of the weaving industry. The rich mestizos and indios were quickly absorbed by 
the rapidly expanding commercial sugar production in nearby Negros Province. Fifth, the 
élitist and traditional educational system in Spanish Philippines prevented the 
development of innovative culture. Margaret Jacob argues that “where science remained 
suspect or suppressed in Catholic countries, as occurred in Catholic Europe, relative 
intellectual stagnation in science was the price to be paid.”137 As part of the reforms, the 
Spanish government promoted a scientific approach to agricultural and craft-based 
production in mid 18th- century Philippines, but this did not ‘take off’. Cushner notes that 
“The Society had regular meetings and made proposals and suggestions. It offered prizes 
to cultivators, farmers, and inventors. But unfortunately no one seemed to pay any 
attention”.138 While the locals’ response could be due to the monopolistic trade which 
renders production unprofitable, one possible reason that industry and scientific crop 
production did not fly was because of an élitist colonial educational system where the 
objective was “not general enlightenment” so much so as “social refinement and 
distinction.”139 The development of an inquisitive mind was not pursued among students 
because of the church’s fear of losing their grip on their consciousness when modern 
science is embraced. It was the opposite of what occurred in modernizing England where 
the cultivation of a critical mind, a preference for empirical knowledge and distrust for 
dogmatism were promoted. This will be discussed alongside the development of local 
political and intellectual elites. 
 
The genesis of cosmopolitan politico-ethical elite  
 
This section discusses the beginnings of the Filipino political and intellectual elite 
in 19th century Philippines, known as the ilustrados.  Forged in the crucible of local 
responses to Spanish colonial expansion and enlightenment rationalism, they were 
fragmented not only economically but also ideologically.140 Some were cosmopolitan in 
their outlook, lacking any form of nationalist sentiment, and thus unable to establish a 
‘vital link’ with the poor and the dispossessed of the country. From this group would 
emerge the political and bureaucratic leaders who would later become part of the 
American colonial political structure. Others were steeped in nationalism and allied with 
the Katipunan [Society], a popular nationalist movement which reached its apogee in the 
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1896 Philippine Revolution. The more than 300 years of Spanish colonial abuse and 
maltreatment was the womb that fostered Filipino nationalism. The ‘un-forming’ and ‘re-
forming’ effects of colonialism141 engendered a fragmented Filipino political and 
intellectual élite, which bear significance to the present development malaise. 
Colonialism and the unique cultural and geographical situation of the Philippines prior to 
colonization engendered “a paradoxical development” which was a contrast to the 
development of nationalism and culture in other parts of Asia.142 Unlike some Asian 
countries, such as Japan, the Philippines at the time of conquest lacked national identity 
and a national ruling élite.143 The Islands’ “political and social organization was deficient 
in cohesion”.144  Moreover, cosmopolitanism was promoted in the education system.145 
One of the unfortunate results of these factors combined was the formation of a 
fragmented élite. The cosmopolitan segment which became part of the subsequent 
American colonial rule lacked nationalist sentiment which, Filomeno V. Aguilar argues, 
informed their “pro-imperial-cum-anticolonial politics”.146  
 
Education was dominated for centuries by the friars and its content was to 
cultivate a religious culture.147 It was in the hands of the Jesuits and the Dominicans that 
the friars’ influence on education “was for a long time almost total.”148 The religious 
orders took total responsibility for providing and financing higher education in the 
Philippines.  University education which was in the hands of the Dominicans (University 
of Santo Tomas founded in 1611) was caught in the political struggle and the church’s 
attempt to “contain the dangers of modern science”. As Thomas points out, the 
“fundamental conflict between church doctrine and modern knowledge” left the 
university education system in an “awkward predicament: they needed to assimilate the 
new sciences and disciplines into the university without giving up its Catholic nature.” 
This inherent contradiction left the Spanish educators, on the one hand, “preoccupied 
with touting the advancements in teaching science that the university was making” and, 
on the other hand, “many of them went to great lengths to undermine the philosophical 
bases of modern science.” They ended up “mocking the ideas of the new sciences” or 
“asserting the supremacy of Catholic theology over all other branches of knowledge.”149 
The poor quality of instruction in the natural and physical sciences in the university was 
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described by one of its alumni, Rizal. The science laboratory was there for display to be 
shown to foreigners and high officials from Spain, not for learning. 150  
 
Higher education at that time was “a system characterized by élitism, church 
control, and culture orientation”, and it was used as a tool for the hispanization of the 
élite – students were required “to act, dress and speak like the Spaniards”.151 Filipinos 
were denied access to western literature, according to Stanley, for fear that this might 
expose the population to unhealthy thoughts. Spanish conservatives considered that those 
who took their higher education in Europe were likely to become filibusteros, agitators 
for change.152 Those who aspired to become engineers had to go to Europe, mostly to 
Belgium.153 The only modern secondary school in the country was the Jesuit-run Ateneo 
Municipal de Manila which taught basic arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, 
elementary science, geography, poetry, history, rhetoric, philosophy, Latin, and Greek. 
The Spaniards had introduced higher education for men long before a nationwide 
elementary and secondary school system was established in 1863.154 By the 1880s more 
than 10,000 males mostly sons of the rich had enrolled in secondary schools and those 
wealthiest sent their sons to European universities.155  A report by the Schurman 
Commission indicates that there were only 1,914 teachers who served a total population 
of 6,709,810 in the concluding years of Spanish rule; a census in 1903 revealed that about 
56 percent of the population 10 years of age or older could neither read nor write in any 
language or dialect.156 Deliberately keeping the majority of the people in a state of 
ignorance by severely limiting educational opportunities and suppressing the 
dissemination of new ideas hindered the establishment of a culture of science and 
innovation in the Philippines, which is crucial to modern transformation. Tirades against 
modern science discouraged material pursuits. Take for, example, Fr. Matias Gomez 
Zamora’s comments: “So also anti-Christian modern philosophy has torn up the bowels 
of knowledge... abandoning herself completely to her idol...And who is her idol, 
gentlemen, who... Don’t you know? ...It is clear enough: materialism saturated with pride, 
or, if you prefer, pride saturated with the material.” Ironically, the contradictions in 
advance education eventually contributed to the emergence of “nationalist thought which 
was so to hurt Spanish interests in the Philippines.”157 
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How was cosmopolitanism intertwined with the formation of a Filipino state class 
engaged in what Aguilar calls “proimperial-cum-anticolonial politics”?  The encomienda 
was a colonial political economic and administrative institution established for exacting 
tribute from the natives in return for the  encomendero’s undertaking to defend his region 
against internal or external disorders.158 The Spanish authorities adapted a pre-Spanish 
indigenous social organization that was primarily decentralized and based on kinship, 
marriage or dependency called barangay; this became “the cornerstone of local 
government”.159 A barangay was typical of an Asiatic society characterized by small, 
self-contained, scattered agriculture and fishing village communities consisting of 45 to 
50 families. There were about 6,000 barangays existing in 1768.160 A barangay was 
ruled by a datu, a traditional leader whose position was ordinarily hereditary but might be 
obtained by force, wealth, and wisdom. This hispanized societal form of organizing the 
relations of domination and exploitation was fused in the state-building process to hasten 
pacification. The duties of the encomenderos were not only to dispense political 
functions, such as maintaining order, enforcing laws, exercising criminal and civil 
jurisdiction, but also to support the priests, build churches, and diffuse Spanish culture. In 
fact, the encomienda embedded the Spanish friars in the evolving Philippine state-society 
complex. Unlike in Spain, the friars wielded enormous power and were influential in both 
governance and pacification processes. The clergy played a crucial role in the 
pacification process through religious consciousness. John Phelan reminds us that Philip 
II, influenced by the Dominican theologian, Francisco Vitoria, was clear in his 
instructions to the Legazpi expedition of a bloodless pacification of the archipelago.161 
Quibuyen points out that “the history of the Philippines is replete with peasant rebellions 
(on the average one every two years throughout the 300 years of Spanish rule) that sought 
to overthrow the clergy and the landed elites.”162 In the local uprising of peasants against 
the principales in northern Philippines, such as the Sarrat revolt in March 3, 1815, where 
farmers stormed government offices and killed some principales, the priests’ mediation 
led to an end of the revolt and set the principales free.  
   
In most cases parish churches became sites of civil administration. The early 
ascendancy of the friars over the state in the Philippines was the result of the confluence 
of several factors. This is, of course, consistent with the religious and political 
arrangement between Vatican and Spain. However, it was due to the scarcity of official 
administrators that Spanish friars increasingly assumed government functions, such as 
inspection of schools, taxation, prisons, public works, censoring of budgets, plays, 
comedies, auditing of accounts, etc. Eva-Lotta Hedman and John Sidel claim that the 
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Catholic Church hierarchy has been one of the pillars of “a bloc of dominant social forces 
in Philippine society” right up to the present day.163 As an administrative system 
established on a primitive economy, the encomienda, essentially, rather than changing the 
social structure, merely maintained the fused political and economic powers of the feudal 
local aristocracy who were part of the colonial apparatus. The encomenderos mostly 
resided in the cities so that they delegated their functions to the local nobilities or 
chieftains (datus). As local political administrators, Phelan argues, “The native 
magistracy acted as intermediaries between the material demands of the Spanish regime 
and the productive capacities of the masses”.164  
  
The introduction of private property and surplus production by the Spanish 
(through forced labor) and the gradual adoption of this innovation by the local magistracy 
transformed the relationship into exploitation. The local offices became the venue by 
which the local élites participated in the exploitation of their own people, and enriched 
themselves in the process. The transformation from communal property and subsistence 
into private property and surplus production created ‘economic inequality’ among the 
native communities, and “the cleavage became both political and economic”.165 When the 
Spaniards introduced the notion of private property as opposed to communal land use, the 
local nobility assumed formal ownership of lands cultivated by their dependents, and this 
trend increased in the 17th century. Private property ownership introduces the idea that 
land itself is a source of wealth, and it was through land ownership that they perpetuated 
their dominant status, and control of local politics. Thus, although it may not be true in all 
cases, possession of wealth based on land properties and participation in the local 
administration tended to coincide. The abolition of the encomienda system coincided 
with the reforms of the Bourbon monarchs in the mid 18th century.166  
 
Enlightened despotism, especially during the reign of Charles III (1759-88), 
motivated Spanish authorities to create a “more rational, efficient, and uniform system of 
imperial administration” so that other units of local government were created.167 Phelan 
argues that part of the ‘modernization’ of the political organization was the introduction 
of election for a minimum term of three years, instead of leadership in the barangay 
following the principles of hereditary succession; this gave rise to a Hispanized Filipino 
political system.168 It is worthy of note that modernization was equated with 
centralization and electoral institutions rather than the creation of a strong and capable 
bureaucracy. Moreover, ‘modernization’ was focused on state apparatus rather than on 
the economy.169 The indios took their local politics seriously, with some politicians 
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vigorously pushing their candidacy for the office of gobernadorcillo to the point of 
holding ‘political rallies’ and wooing voters through fiestas in which entertainment and 
rice wine were supplied by aspirants to office.170 Phelan notes, “the Filipinos were 
rapidly responding to some Hispanic political practices”.171  
 
The enthusiastic response was expected given that ascendancy to public office 
meant possessing that property in the means of coercion to give them access to socially 
produced surplus. In fact, this may explain the high incidence of violence during 
elections in the Philippines up to today as the ruling élites compete for the means to 
power and riches in the public rather than in the private sphere.172  Their positions in 
public office provide them opportunities for extra legal enrichment and also power over 
their people. Where the principales involved in running town offices as gobernadorcillos 
were neither necessarily men of means nor politically influential, they were, as Glenn 
May refers, “political surrogates”.173 By examining municipal elections in the late 19th 
century in Batangas Province, May observes that political power resided among the 
“protagonists” or “power brokers”, coming from various factions of interests, such as 
economic, religious, and anti-clerical or anti-Spanish. Most of them possessed proprietary 
wealth through money lending, landownership, and marketing of commercial crops. Even 
though they did not seek public office themselves, their control of the municipal office 
through their surrogates ensured, as May points out, their control of tax collection, law 
enforcement, distribution of public works, and monopoly of franchises.174  
 
The political economic system established by the Spanish colonial government 
generated an upper class coming from the local magistracy, known as the principalia. 
Other than the gobernadorcillo, the members of the upper class included the bureaucrats, 
such as the deputy, a constable, an inspector of palm trees, an inspector of rice fields, and 
a notary; those in the service of the church, such as the fiscales (the sacristans) and the 
cantors of the choir were also part of the upper class and enjoyed the statutory privileges 
of the cabezas. 175 The principalia was composed primarily of the Chinese mestizos and 
the rich indios, the precursor of most of the ilustrados. It is important that we understand 
the social conditions surrounding the emergence of the wealthy and landed Chinese 
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mestizos and native indios because they later would form the country’s local ruling élite, 
the ilustrados. Their rise was interlinked with the imperialistic aims of Spain engaged in 
a dynamic relationship with the Chinese world system. Wickberg points out that 
“assimilation was a constant process throughout the period of Spanish rule.”176 From the 
beginning the Spanish establishments in the Philippines were “a mission…founded and 
administered in the interests of religion.”177 The objective was “to Catholicize and 
hispanize the peoples”, and this of course included the Chinese in the country. The friars’ 
long-term goal was to convert Asian peoples, especially the Chinese and Japanese, to 
Catholicism with the Philippines as the base.178 
 
However, this attempt at cultural assimilation of the Chinese had little success.179 
This is not surprising because Chinese identity based on Confucianism does not admit 
cultural equality with “barbarians” as expressed by China’s self-image as Zhongguo (the 
Central Kingdom).180 Europe was an outsider to the Chinese world cultural system, not 
the other way around.181 In 17th century or earlier, Spanish policy shifted towards 
encouraging Chinese and native women marriages as a “first step toward assimilation”, 
thereby creating a mestizo progeny that was hispanized, Catholic, and pro-Spanish. By 
1810 there were about 120,000 mestizos in a total Philippine population of 2.5 million.182 
Spain’s goal of creating a hispanized wealthy local people loyal to Spain had been finally 
achieved with the emergence and increasing presence, socially and politically, of the new 
local landed élites in mid 18th century. This meant that the Spanish government no longer 
had to rely so much on an economy dominated by the culturally ‘uncompromising’ 
Chinese. As the native aristocrats’ economic and political standing increased, they 
became more closely associated with the colonial power and became “pillars of colonial 
administration and intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled”.183 They were the 
richest and politically dominant in the provinces and sought to maintain their being 
different as more hispanized and pro-Spanish than the indios. There was prestige 
associated with the mestizo culture, and being a mestizo was a status symbol.184   
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 It was the landed Chinese mestizos and native indios that benefited enormously 
when the free trade regime was established by English authorities in 1762 and further 
strengthened in 1766 by the Spanish colonial government under the sphere of English 
influence. An export-crop economy was established and this new form of wealth based 
on ownership or control of large tracts of plantation, and the adoption of relatively 
sophisticated Spanish culture became the new standards of prestige and social mobility – 
a “filipinized Hispanic culture” emerged. The ‘distinctive’ élite culture shared by the 
wealthy Filipinos was also experienced in education. As the newly-rich mestizos and 
indios and those who were not as wealthy as the caciques of the provinces sent their sons 
to Manila for education “a small but highly important professional group, whose 
membership transcended ethnic lines developed in Manila.” An educated élite was 
formed where “identity of professional interest and attitude was more important than 
differences in culture practices.” Moreover, Mexican independence forced Spain to have 
closer links with the Philippines, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and 
steamship technology made travel between Europe and the Philippines speedier. These 
factors brought new liberal ideas and cultural influences into the colony as aspiring 
ilustrados educated in Europe became important sources and transmitters of 
Enlightenment ideas from Europe then to Manila and to the local regions.185   Liberal 
ideas, such as individual liberty, universal equality, and free markets took root in 
Manila’s educational centers.  
 
We need, however, to recognize that the ilustrados were not a homogeneous 
group. Floro Quibuyen argues that the term ilustrado could not be used as a class concept 
because not only were the ilustrados heterogeneous in economic background, but a great 
division in ideological or political commitments existed among them. Political and 
ideological division existed among the most prominent of the ilustrados in the 
Propaganda Movement — José Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, and Graciano Lopéz Jaena — 
than say, for example, Rizal (the recognized moral and intellectual leader of the 
Movement) and Andrés Bonifacio (the Great Plebeian) who was the leader of the 
Katipunan, a mass-based revolutionary group led by petty clerks, laborers, and artisans in 
Manila.186  Quibuyen argues that the extremely wealthy among the ilustrados belonged to 
the far right of the political spectrum among the Filipinos, and they were cosmopolitan in 
their outlook. This highly privileged local élite never advocated independence and were 
the first to shift their allegiance to the US when it became clear that the Revolution had 
been defeated. The first Filipino members of the Philippine Commission, which governed 
the Philippines after the American conquest, came from this wealthy and conservative 
sector – Jose Luzuriaga, Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda – and so did the 
rest who filled the native slots in the American colonial bureaucracy. Other ilustrados, 
though not as wealthy, had enough means to study in universities, locally or abroad, and 
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eventually became the country’s first professionals (doctors, pharmacists, lawyers) and 
businessmen. These ilustrados became active participants of the revolution, such as 
Generals Antonio Luna, Jose Alejandrino, Edilberto Evangelista, Mamerto Natividad, 
Miguel Malvar, Pio Valenzuela, Vicente Lukban, and of course, Rizal’s brother, Paciano, 
etc. They were nationalist to the very core, unlike their richer counterparts.187 In this 
study I use the political/ideological categories ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘nationalist’ ilustrados, 
rather than ethnic and class categories.  
 
The modern world came to Spanish Philippines haltingly with the penetration of 
western commerce toward the end of the 18th century and produced stultifying effects on 
the lives of the people. Ideas of nationalism as perceived by the peasants, middle class 
and ilustrados in terms of their own experiences in a rapidly changing world solidified 
into a hegemonic nationalist movement, the Katipunan (Society), which culminated in 
the 1896 Philippine Revolution – the first anti-colonial democratic revolution in Asia. 
The period from 1892 to 1902 was an historical moment in Philippine national history 
when Spanish colonialism resulted in the formation of the Filipino nation. In his path-
breaking work, Pasyon and Revolution, Reynaldo Ileto brilliantly showed the connection 
between a ‘folk tradition’, pasyon, and the 1896 Philippine Revolution. He argues that the 
Catholic-church-approved epic of Christendom that was said to replace the declining 
native epic traditions in the 16th and 17th centuries, “continued to maintain a coherent 
image of the world” of the Filipino masses and that although the pasyon “appears to be 
alien in content” it “reveals the vitality of the Filipino mind”.188 The Pasyon frame was 
“the native appropriation of [the] Judeo-Christian theme” and “provided the masses with 
a coherent framework for interpreting and changing their world.”189  
 
Building on the works of Ileto and others, Quibuyen argues that the process of 
national formation in the later part of 19th century was made possible through a grand 
narrative of emancipation which comprised of two strands of counter-hegemonic 
narratives: the Enlightenment narrative(s) of the nationalist ilustrados and the Pasyon 
narrative of the popular masses;it was “used by the Spanish colonizers to inculcate among 
the Indios loyalty to Spain and Church” but it also had an unintended consequence of 
providing the “lowland Philippine society with a language for articulating its own values, 
ideals, and even hopes of liberation.”190 In his own study, Quibuyen strongly asserts that 
it was Rizal’s moral and intellectual leadership and through Andrés Bonifacio’s and the 
Katipunan’s organizational leadership on the ground that the hegemonic nationalist 
project which had reached its apogee in the revolution of 1896 was established, no matter 
how short-lived it was.191 The idea that because “the nation was … embodying a sacred 
covenant between moral individuals… the means with which to fight for the nation, a 
sacred end, have to be moral and sacred as well.” It was this nationalist sentiment shared 
by the nationalist ilustrados and the masses which became the ‘spirit of the national 
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revolution’ whose end-goal was to recover what was lost because of colonialism. 
Quibuyen argues that “it was by this conjuncture of sentiments – the ilustrados’ and the 
folk’s – that the nationalist tradition became truly national-popular in the Gramscian 
sense.”192 Bonifacio’s manifesto was largely informed by Rizal’s historical work. Written 
in the form of pasyon, Bonifacio’s manifesto begins with pre-Spanish period where a 
flourishing indigenous society existed, and emphasized the negative impact of 
colonialism. A call to action among the Filipino folks was also deployed appealing to 
their reason.193  Isabelo de los Reyes claims, based on interviews of hundreds of 
Katipuneros in 1898, “that the Katipunan was an association to be feared, because it was 
composed of common ignorant people, yet although the plebeian thinks little, for this 
little he will die before giving it up.” 194 
 
Rizal’s broader understanding of nationalism made him resist a total embrace of 
the Pasyon’s redemption narrative or the nationalist ilustrados’ narrative of 
independence. His hesitation was because he knew deeply in himself that a nationalist 
project whose only aim is an independent state was doomed to fail to truly liberate the 
Filipino people. 195 During his trial for treason, Rizal made a distinction between being 
free and being independent: “…many have taken my phrase “to enjoy democratic rights” 
for “to have independence”, two entirely different things. A people can be free without 
being independent, and a people can be independent without being free.”196 For Rizal a 
free nation is first attained at the spiritual and moral level. In other words, Rizal 
problematized what would later constitute Partha Chatterjee’s, an internationally 
renowned subaltern and postcolonial scholar of the 20th century, critique of “the all-too-
easy connection, claimed by every nationalist, of the state with the nation and the nation 
with the people.”197 Rizal’s thoughts resonate in Chatterjee’s own work in which 
Chatterjee argued that nationalism –  
 
launches its most powerful, creative and historically most significant project: to 
fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation 
is an imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being. In this, its 
true and essential domain, the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is 
in the hands of the colonial power. The dynamics of this historical project is 
completely missed in conventional histories in which the story of nationalism 
begins with the contest of political power.198 
 
Rizal, Quibuyen notes, had “succeeded in putting his message across, at least to 
the ilustrados, for whom the two novels were originally meant – after all, the ilustrados 
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were going to be the leaders in the task of social redemption.” The message was 
uncompromising: “the masses did look up to the ilustrados as their leaders” and that if 
the ilustrados fail to embrace the real essence of their nationalist undertaking then “the 
evening twilight” rather than a “brilliant, clear … and beautiful day” was sure to come to 
the country. Such disasters are not uncommon today in post-colonial societies where 
what Frantz Fanon describes as the “useless native class” has just replaced the colonial 
masters as the new oppressors of their own people. This local élite which absorbs much 
of the value system of their colonizers renders nationalism not exactly the antidote of 
imperialism. Rizal’s genius enabled him to see at that time the tragedy in the Philippines 
of today. 199 Many elements of society who were anxious for change were attracted to the 
league, among them Bonifacio, who became one of the founders of the Liga and had 
proven himself an astute organizer of the movement.  
 
It is important to examine what kind of a Filipino nation-state Rizal and the Liga 
imagined. Because people behind the Liga did not really have the chance to rule the 
country, the movement’s Constitution, written by Rizal in Hong Kong while on his way 
home to the Philippines, would be a useful indicator. It was clear that the imagined nation 
by the nationalist ilustrados was inclusive, just, and developmental.200 Rizal, having seen 
in his travels Japan, the US, Germany, and other modernizing countries of the 19th 
century, possessed a modernizing outlook. In the mind of the foremost Filipino 
intellectual of the time and other nationalist ilustrados was an image of a Philippine 
economy with a robust agriculture and industry. In the league’s Constitution, the aims 
and strategies of the Liga were to encourage agriculture and the introduction of machines 
and industries.201 Of course, as Chatterjee asserts, the development of the spiritual and 
material domains are two sides of the same coin, and are fundamental to build a just and 
progressive society. He writes: 
 
By my reading, anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty 
within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial 
power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into 
two domains – the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the 
‘outside’ of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain 
                                               
199  The Liga was founded and inaugurated on July 3, 1892 with Ambrosio Salvador as the President, 
Agustin de la Rosa as Fiscal, Bonifacio Arevalo as Treasurer, and Deodato Arellano as Secretary.  
200 The aims of the Liga were: (1) To unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous and 
homogeneous body; (2) Mutual protection in every want and necessity; (3) Defense against all violence and 
injustice; (4) Encouragement of instruction, agriculture, and commerce; and (5) Study and application of 
reforms. http://www.jose-rizal.eu/ligafilipinae.html.  
201 “The aims of the Liga were to be carried out through the creation of a governing body composed of the 
Supreme Council, the Provincial Council, and the Popular Council. The members were each to pay ten 
centavos as monthly dues. Each of the members was free to choose a symbolic name for himself. The funds 
of the society were to be used in the following manner: (1) The member or his son, who while not having 
the means shall show application and great capacity, shall be sustained; (2) The poor shall be supported in 
his right against any powerful person’ (3) The member who shall have suffered any loss shall be aided; (4) 
Capital shall be loaned to the member who shall need it for an industry or agriculture; (5) The introduction 
of machines and industries, new or necessary in the country, shall be favored; and (6) Shops, stores and 
establishment shall be opened where the members more economically than elsewhere. http://www.jose-




where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this 
domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its 
accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other 
hand, is an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity.202 
 
This wisdom reverberates as the perils of assimilating the outside aspects of 
nationalism without internalizing the inside, the more difficult reformation of men’s spirit 
which Chatterjee calls “the essential marks of cultural identity”. The Philippines, 
especially Manila in the 19th century, deceptively appeared to be a society undergoing 
modernization. However, it was a superficial modernity characterized by consumerism 
analogous to what Yukichi Fukuzawa called “the outward forms of material civilization”. 
Wickberg describes the superficial cultural transformation: 
 
The urbanization of Manila and the development of more cosmopolitan 
tastes and a more sophisticated brand of Spanish cultural influence found 
expression in a variety of ways. For one thing, there was a gradual, but 
impressive – for a colonial Asian country – development of newspapers 
and periodicals in Manila after 1850. [B]esides periodicals, there was 
some development of other forms of literature, particularly poetry and the 
novel in Spanish. [S]everal theatres were maintained, presenting dramas 
and comedies in Spanish and Tagalog. Western style dress became 
characteristics of men of the upper class in Manila during the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. In household effects, as in dress, the increase in 
Western influence was noticeable. Those who had become wealthy from 
the sale of export crops indulged themselves in a taste for European luxury 
goods, particularly items of furniture, as well as European carriages in 
which to parade about.203 
 
The cosmopolitan development was, of course, enjoyed by the rich segment of the 
Spanish Philippine society – that segment of the ilustrados who had no connection with 
the poor and the dispossessed of the country. They worked for the assimilation of the 
Philippines into the colonial political structure. In the end, Rizal’s execution by the 
Spanish authorities for treason, Bonifacio’s assassination by and the subsequent triumph 
of the wealthy conservative ilustrados paved the way for the triumph of American 
imperialism.   
 
The English nationalist historic bloc and a culture of innovation   
 
This section examines the broader social environment in 17th –century England to 
show that the absence of colonial structures and the development of solid nationalist 
political, economic, and cultural elites provided the leadership to establish a social 
environment that nurtured innovative activities. Practically all of today's developed 
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countries, including Britain and the US, the supposed homes of the free market and free 
trade, have become rich on the basis of policy recipes that contradict today's 
orthodoxy.204 Nationalism, that sense of collective destiny – the common weal- and pride 
in the nation which form the foundation and basis of social integration, was the 
motivation for developmental policies. However, the Renaissance period, Reinert notes, 
“rediscovered and flagged the importance and creativity of the individual” which 
promotes a culture of technology and innovation.205 It is important to note here that 
nationalism and scientism fashioned common weal and individualism together as 
inseparable components of the social fabric of modernizing societies.  
  
A study by Cary Nederman shows that medieval England (second half of 15th-
century) was already pregnant with nationalism. During this period ‘collectivist’ 
nationalism promoted those economic values, such as economic achievement, 
competitiveness and prosperity, which became the basis of the economic reform 
movement of the early Tudor period, hence providing evidence that (early) English 
nationalism may have impelled the capitalist transformation which was initially realized 
in 16th –century English agriculture. 206 It is possible to argue that, unlike the more 
conventional notion, political consciousness (nationalism) could precede economic 
change (capitalism).207 It is not inconceivable that ideas for change could emanate from 
the politico-ethical structure, and not always from the economy.  Nederman points out 
that Sir John Fortescue’s (an English jurist, legal theorist, and considered a ‘forerunner’ 
of the economic reform movement) ideas influenced the English monarchy under King 
Edward on the form of government – dominium regale et politicum – based on 
consensual law and the sharing of power. He argued that the English government 
“organized politically and royally, generates a legal structure superior to those systems 
found in continental Europe.”  The rule of law prevented the monarchy from abusing its 
power and also allowed for the enactment of policies that “enhance the wealth of the 
entire nation.”  
 
Clearly, the embryonic modern idea of authoritative power separate from the 
personal authority of individuals developed in England much earlier than elsewhere in 
Europe, and it was a ‘political innovation’ to ensure economic development. In 
Fortescue’s estimation, rulers who govern by the rule of law benefit  because, as private 
persons, subjects are “encouraged (indeed, expected) to contribute to the public good by 
seeking their personal advantage in economic activity.” If the people’s ruler “adopts 
                                               
204 Largely influenced by the thought of Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy . London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1885, Ha -Joon Chang’s, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press, 2002 argues that an activist developmental state is 
necessary in economic development, and history tells us that. Taking similar cues from List, Reinert (2007) 
prescribes to developing countries a focus on building national productive power by establishing a critical 
mass of increasing return activities, outside the sector producing raw materials.          
205 Reinert, How Countries, p. 73.  
206 Cary Nederman, ‘Economic nationalism and the ‘spirit of capitalism’: civic collectivism and national 
wealth in the thought of John Fortescue’, History of Political Thought 26 (2), 2005, pp. 266-283. 
207 This is the theme of Dyer’s critique on Greenfeld’s idea of nationalism as the spirit of capitalism. He 
rejects Greenfeld’s argument because he believes that economic change precedes political change, the more 
conventional notion. See Christopher Dyer, ‘Review- Power and Profit/The Spirit of Capitalism’, History 




policies that impoverish them, they will express their displeasure directly and violently.” 
Providing a political environment by which the private initiatives of the subjects in the 
economy are allowed to flourish was for the English the best policy to ensure political 
stability, security and prestige for the monarchy and wealth for the country: “The greatest 
safety, truly, and also the most honor that may come to the king is that his realm should 
be rich in every estate”.208  
 
Evidently, the English monarchy was very different from that of the 16th-century 
or the absolutist monarchies strongly entrenched on the Continent of Europe. The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 placed England in its new constitutional path towards 
parliamentary sovereignty unconstrained by a fixed constitution or judicial review, 
centralization and the conflation of executive and legislative powers. This system offered 
more flexibility and freedom from hamstringing over-legalization that stifles political 
debate.209 The political system engendered many other democratic institutions, such as 
trial by jury, the common law, the establishment of national news papers, the philosophic 
tradition of Bacon, Locke, and Hume, the ‘Dissenting Academies’, and the non-
conforming sects, which “if not entirely unique to England, were in combination 
impressive evidence of a democratic culture providing a fertile soil for the flowering of 
local initiatives in all parts of the country.” 210  
     
Nationalism manifested in Fortescue’s ‘political innovation’ had to wait until it 
found expression in the ‘knowledge innovation’ (the so-called scientific revolution) that 
the first Industrial Revolution materialized in English society. Nationalism was key in the 
institutionalization of science in the English society (Chapter 1).  The power of ideas as 
‘a way of seeing things’ influenced the English national development strategy to secure a 
dynamic economy. The belief in the possibility of achieving industrial progress by the 
method of observation and experiment came to the 18th century England largely through 
Francis Bacon’s ideas, enlarged by the genius of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.211 In 
mid-16th century, Francis Bacon, a lawyer, a statesman, intellectual reformer, philosopher 
and champion of science wrote the essay, Of Innovations. In his The New Atlantis, Bacon 
elevated the stature of science – a new system of learning based on empirical and 
inductive principles and the active development of new arts and inventions, a system 
whose ultimate goal would be the production of practical knowledge for “the use and 
benefit of men” and relief of the human condition. The genius about the Scientific 
Revolution was in finally throwing off the shackles of dogma that had impeded human 
progress. Although 18th-century science was, of course, very different from the 20th-
century science, Chris Freeman and Francisco Louçã argue that “an experimental, 
enquiring, rational spirit and approach was necessary condition for the work of scientists 
and inventors alike.” In fact, they point out that “the scientific revolution, dated either at 
the foundation of the Royal Society in 1660 or earlier in the century, preceded the 
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financial revolution, the commercial revolution, the transport revolution and the 
Industrial Revolution, as these overlapping changes are conveniently dated.” 212   
   
It was when these visions and ideas left the hands of these intellectuals and were 
translated into political visions of rulers and economic goals of businessmen and ordinary 
people that the power of ideas was unleashed to transform English society. English 
political leaders took to heart the ideals of rational governance and the role of technology 
in the economy.  Many economic historians point out that the monarchs from Edward III 
(1327-77) to the Tudors, especially Henry VII (1485-1509) and Elizabeth I (1558-1603), 
used developmental policies that would today be described as “infant industry 
protection”.213  Protectionist policies were clearly practiced in England under Edward III 
(1312-77), but it was during Henry VII’s rule (1485) when emulation became a strategic 
economic policy of England.214 During his visits to Burgundy, Henry VII of England 
realized that the wealthy areas were those with a woollen textile industry. So convinced 
that England should change its development strategy, the king deployed a combination of 
trade and innovation policies to build the English wool industry and make England a 
producer and exporter of manufactured textiles rather than an exporter of raw material. 
  
These policies were continued by the English Parliament. For example, in 1721, 
Ha-Joon Chang notes, Robert Walpole, the first English prime minister, launched an 
industrial program “that protected and nurtured English manufacturers against superior 
competitors in the Low Countries, then the centre of European manufacturing.” Walpole 
declared that “nothing so much contributes to promote the public wellbeing as the 
exportation of manufactured goods and the importation of foreign raw material.”215 
Reinert (2007) points out that the economic policy toolbox included imposition of export 
duties to ensure that foreign textile producers importing raw material from England 
produced more expensive products than those of English producers. Wool manufacturers 
were also guaranteed tax exemptions for a certain period and granted monopolies in 
certain areas and for certain periods. The Tudor economic reform movement established 
a strong industrial sector, a raw material monopoly (wool), and overseas trade.216  In fact, 
Chang notes, from Walpole’s time when Britain began to reduce its tariffs, the average 
tariff rate was between 40-50 percent, still high compared to France’s (20 percent) and 
Germany’s (10 percent).  
 
The visions of a prosperous England were translated into economic activities of 
increasing returns as the ideas of reason and progress were embraced by English elites. 
These enlightenment ideals were promoted in English society with ‘industriousness’ 
closely associated with ‘productivity and profit making’ rather than holding public office. 
The English bourgeoisie, some of whom were also members of the Royal Society as 
scientists and politicians (e.g. Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, and William Petty) came 
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from the landed class, especially from the gentry – men who did not regard their 
intellectual pursuits as a kind of professional activity, let alone a type of office holding. 
Ellen Meiksins Wood maintains that a different capitalist system first emerged in Britain 
in the agrarian sector of 16th-century England (Chapter 1). The expansion of wool exports 
induced the government to implement the First Enclosure Movement in 15th - and 16th-
century England, resulting in the conversion of open arable fields to private pastures in 
areas suitable for grazing. This created market-dependent wage workers from the small 
peasant cultivators, and manorial lords rented their lands to large farmers. The growing 
disequilibrium between the fixed rent that landlords received and the higher economic 
rents expected from the adoption of new technology led to the Second Enclosure 
Movement in the 18th century.217  
 
The English agrarian ‘revolution’, regarded by many economic historians as the 
critical component of the Industrial Revolution, was characterized by intensive, 
integrated, crop-livestock husbandry systems. Intensive rotation of arable land between 
food grains and feed crops and the use of green forage and fodder were key innovations. 
The primary impact of the English agricultural ‘revolution’ was to increase land, not 
labour, productivity. According to Peter Timmer “[t]he agrarian revolution apparently did 
not supply surplus labour for an industrial army of workers. It did provide food for the 
rapidly rising population from which both an increased agricultural and industrial labor 
force were recruited.”218 Agrarian capitalism had completely transformed the most basic 
human relations and practices, and had impacted a dynamic English economy in the 17th 
century  and would eventually gave rise to its industrial form in late 18th century. It had to 
wait for the Scientific Revolution when the pursuit of mechanical knowledge was widely 
applied in industry.  
 
Margaret Jacob argues that varied ideas in regard to the utility of science 
generated different responses and consequences in the English and French societies.219  
Although it was from René Descartes220, a French philosopher and mathematician, that a 
new order of gaining knowledge based on scientific method and rational thinking had 
originated, England was much more successful in exploiting science for industry than 
France. The ideological responses were conditioned by the “very real social, religious, 
and political differences” that separated the English from the French. Under a 
constitutional monarchy, the Protestant English society was presented with a science 
within an ideological framework that encouraged material prosperity through the 
practical industrial application of new mechanical philosophies — the so-called 
Newtonian synthesis of Cartesian science. By contrast, in the Catholic French society, 
Cartesian science was “ideologically absolutist in politics”, directing the scientific energy 
towards promoting order in the state rather than towards the utility of mechanical science 
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in industrial devices. It presents a similarity to Spanish-Philippine society not only in 
terms of politics but also the influence of religion in the education system.  Jacob points 
out that there was popular secularization of Newtonian science as it became an essential 
part not only of the world of inventors and entrepreneurs but also of English people from 
all walks of life. Scientific culture was not a mere adjunct to the merging mechanized 
industry, it was its essential source. The applications of technological knowledge in 
practical aspects of life were widely discussed across broad sectors of society, with the 
proliferation of local clubs, societies and associations, creating a huge and enthusiastic 
audience for scientific demonstrations by itinerant London lecturers.  Moreover, Jacob 
argues that “British education in mathematics was superior ... must be seen as one part in 
the complex story why Britain industrialized first.”221  
 
In England, the exclusion of the Dissenters from Grammar Schools and in Oxford 
and Cambridge led to the establishment of ‘Dissenting Academies’ where the Baconian-
Puritan model of education was promoted. The schools emphasized empiricism and the 
natural sciences suitable for young men who were to go into business or profession in 
trades and engineering. There was little by way of separate education in science and 
engineering. 222 They desired education that was more relevant to daily life than classical 
curricula. Reformers called for replacing Scholastic studies with classes that taught a 
practical understanding of the world. As Dissenters were excluded from holding public 
office, able men were more likely to go into professions such as the Nonconformist 
ministry, a branch of medicine or into a family business so much so that industry first 
took root in Scotland and Glasgow. Charles Webster’s book, The Great Instauration: 
Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626-1660 (1975), put beyond reasonable doubt the link 
between Puritan ideals, the promotion of science. It was not so much “the origin of 
revolutionary ideas”, as Peter Harrison argues, “but rather in the emergence of an ethos 
that would promote what we call a ‘scientific culture’, in which the values of 
utilitarianism, empiricism, and rationalism are given primary space.”223    
 
Webster successfully established the “chronology and connexions of the 
movement, showing it to be more extensive, more deeply rooted, and more practically-
oriented than generally imagined.”224 The Puritan intelligentsia battled for intellectual 
revolution and sought to promote rational reforms on many issues such as education, 
technological and agrarian improvement. But their reforming aims came to an end with 
the failure of the Revolution and the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. Consequently, 
Margaret Jacob argues that the reforms were taken up by one group led by Robert Boyle, 
John Wilkins, John Wallis, Walter Charleton, John Evelyn, Christopher Wren and others 
who “continued to advocate and engage in the organized pursuit of experimental science 
... but they dissociated this project from any radical reform of church, state, the economy 
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or society.”  Jacob further argues that “they did not cease entirely to be reformers, but 
couched their reforming sentiments in vague terms of improving man’s health and estate 
through science.” In fact, these reforms would progress without necessarily changing the 
prevailing social structure in the direction of greater social equity.225 Moreover, English 
scientists, inventors and entrepreneurs founded the Derby Philosophical Society and their 
ideas as to the ideal factory organization and division of labour led to the emergence of 
factory-based production, which defined the future paths to cost-reducing mechanization 
of the cotton textile, iron, and water power, railways and steam power industries.226 This 
replaced the pre-industrial small workshops of individual inventor-entrepreneurs and 
cottages of putting-out rural industries. The superimposition of new technologies, new 
procedures and new best practices supported a rapid increase in productivity and led to 
radical advances in the relative position of English industries and firms in the world 
economy. Considering the sorry state of science education in the Spanish Philippines it is 
understandable that the scientific and technological activities of the Economic Society of 
Friends of Manila during the Spanish time were unlikely to have any significant result.  
 
     
Conclusions  
 
This study traces the roots of the development challenge in the Philippines to 
develop its technological capability. The historical analysis was undertaken to locate the 
beginnings of the formation and the subsequent entrenchment of the dominant global 
historic bloc(s) in Spanish Philippines (1565-1898). A broader social environment 
created by an interacting nationalist historic bloc that nurtures innovation is crucial in 
technological innovation and industry growth. This chapter’s analysis shows Spanish 
colonialism to have established and entrenched a global trade- and financial-based 
economic interest in the Philippines comprising foreign merchants (Spanish, Chinese, 
English, and Americans) and their local counterpart, the landed, wealthy Filipino 
ilustrados who emerged from the political structure and the liberal economic reforms 
instituted by Spain. It was the colonial government’s economic policy of free trade and 
economic openness as a means of wealth creation, which facilitated the entrenchment of 
trade interests. A trading economy does not create massive employment opportunities. 
Generating high profits through the mere buying and selling of goods, traders generally 
do not by themselves venture into manufacturing, which entails more risks.   
 
While global trade with more advanced nations, initiated by the Spanish and 
Chinese merchants, gave the Philippine economy the impetus to move from a condition 
of backwardness into making advances in agriculture, the colonial free trade regime from 
the mid-18th century was a wrong path as far as development of the productive powers of 
the local economy was concerned. If List had been heard, restrictions on commercial 
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activity would have been imposed to promote the growth of production and service 
industries. The interaction between an existing Chinese world system and an expanding 
European system provided the milieu in which foreign trade activities by the Chinese 
during the pre-Spanish period and the subsequent strengthening of this trading activity in 
alliance with the Spaniards and then later the English and Americans, created an 
institutional constraint which channelled the economic activities of the local élites 
towards wealth-creation based on land and crop exportation. It did not provide the venue 
for an industrial transformation; instead a rural proto-industry, a precursor for 
mechanized manufacturing industry, was ruined.  
 
Spanish colonialism engendered a fragmented local élite and nationalism. The 
more cosmopolitan ilustrados which had a hispanized national identity, cultural and 
economic affinity with the colonizers did not have nationalist sentiment. Hence their 
agenda was for assimilation. However, the nationalist segment of the ilustrados provided 
moral and intellectual leadership to the masses as well as combat help during the 1896 
revolution. Through a robust alliance of the middle class and the masses, the historic bloc 
established what Quibuyen calls a “hegemonic nationalist-popular will” which toppled 
the three-and-a-half century Spanish rule over the Philippines. The valuable lesson 
learned was that nationalist sentiment borne by educated nationalist middle class and the 
poor farmers was a potent force for ‘change’ in Spanish Philippines. The formation of a 
global historic bloc committed to free market democracy has been presented by some 
scholars as a quintessential phenomenon in the era of globalization. But countries which 
have colonial experiences, such as the Philippines, have been confronted with such a 
constraining structure a long time ago, and the formidable challenge faced by these 
countries is how to create a counter-hegemonic nationalist developmental bloc. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that among the major institutional bottlenecks which 
hindered the development of industry in Spanish-Philippines besides free trade are lack of 
financial capital, technology, and a conservative educational system that did not promote 
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